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Foreword
The Centres of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
collectively maintain the world´s largest international collection of genetic resources. As
this has been assembled in cooperation with countries and institutions world-wide, the
Centres do not claim ownership of the materials: they are held in trust for the world
community and are available without restriction to all bona fide users. The policy of
unrestricted access has proven to be a very effective way for the CGIAR to meet the
needs of its partners, particularly in developing countries.
There has been an increasing tendency for countries to develop national policies and
strategies which, directly or indirectly, place restrictions on the free flow of genetic
resources. This trend is supported by the recently concluded agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the Uruguay round of negotiations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which requires the implementation of intellectual
property protection legislation over plant varieties by signatory nations. In the wake of
the coming into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity many countries have also
begun to develop national policies and legislation to govern the conditions under which
access will be granted to the genetic diversity found within their borders
These developments threaten the free flow of genetic resources between nations and
bring into question the role of the in-trust international collections of the CGIAR. The
ability of these collections to continue to serve the needs of farmers and plant breeders
throughout the world is dependent on the adoption of policies which allow unrestricted
access while ensuring the benefits derived from their use are shared equitably.
This publication is a contribution to the current debate on the related questions of
access to genetic resources and compensation for the exploitation of these resources.
While the concept of Material Transfer Agreements, described in these pages, was primarily
developed to meet the needs of the International Agricultural Research Institutes, it may
also have promise as a mechanism for facilitating the exchange of genetic resources
between countries. Under the proposed agreements, genetic resources would be made
available to the CGIAR Centres - and thus to the global community based on the formal
understanding that the material would not be subject to appropriation and that source
nations would derive benefit from its provision, either collectively through participation in
the multilateral system, or directly from the user of the germplasm.
A global strategy for the sustainable conservation and use of genetic resources requires
the commitment of the world community to safeguard the total diversity of valuable plants.
The success of this strategy in turn requires an understanding of the interdependence of
nations in relation to plant genetic resources and a global commitment to ensure that the
material remains accessible to those who need it. It is hoped that this study will provoke
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I. Summary and Recommendations
Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) are routinely used by for-profit organizations to
transfer genetic material. Increasingly they have gained acceptance also among public
not-for-profit laboratories, particularly in the USA. They are contracts that can be tailored
to the specific needs of the parties that conclude them. Should the International Agricultural
Research Centres in the CGIAR use MTAs when they receive or distribute genetic material?
To date there has been no need to do so. The Centres received genetic material without
conditions, and could therefore release it without conditions.
In the wake of the negotiations of the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in
1992, which recognizes a country´s sovereignty over plant genetic resources on its
territory, several countries have begun developing policies on the release of germplasm.
Such policies are expected to condition the release of genetic material from their territory
upon recognition of their claims to compensation and technology access as defined in
the Convention. This could lead to a hardening of the terms under which countries release
genetic material to the Centres, unless the Centres can effectively safeguard the rights
of source countries. This suggests the need to rethink the Centres´ current policy of free
and unconditional germplasm distribution, and to examine what the Centres could do to
support the efforts of developing countries in realizing their claims to compensation and
technology transfer under the Convention on Biological Diversity.
There is no doubt that the interest of the global community in a vigorous agricultural
research activity is best served through a system that allows for the exchange of genetic
material with minimal restrictions. The developing countries share this interest, because
without making their genetic material available to the user community they will not realize
their rights to compensation and access to technology.
The crucial question then is how to safeguard the interests of source countries without
narrowing the exchange of genetic material. For the Centres, arrangements that require
them to control the flow of material into and out of their collections would divert resources
from agricultural research into administrative tasks.
In this situation, we basically see three possible responses for the Centres: (1) they
would continue to freely distribute genetic material they currently hold and accept new
material only from countries and sources that make it available without restrictions; their
support to genetic resources conservation, agricultural breeding, and technology transfer
would be seen as fulfilling the rights of developing countries under the Convention on
Biological Diversity; (2) they would help maximize profits for developing nations from
trading their genetic resources, by distributing Centre material under MTAs that require
profit-sharing upon successful commercial exploitation, collect payments and place them
in a fund to the benefit of source nations or all developing nations; or (3) they would
facilitate the realization of source country rights to compensation and technology transfer
without disrupting or jeopardizing the operation of their genetic resources collections.
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
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We believe that Centres should pursue option (1) as long as they can maintain
sufficient access to genetic resources from developing countries. However, we anticipate
that for the reasons mentioned this will no longer, or not much longer, be acceptable to
the developing world. At the same time, because it would divert scarce resources from
research tasks, we cannot support option (2) under which the Centres would act as
collection agents for source countries. We believe option (3) would represent a fair
compromise. Although the Centres would not take responsibility for arranging
compensation, they would significantly facilitate possibilities for source nations to realize
access to technology and sharing of profits through negotiations with users.
In order to focus consideration of the compromise proposal, both within the CGIAR
and within the broader community of source nations, user groups and the NGO
community, we prepared a set of draft MTAs and a draft policy statement to be issued
by individual Centres.
Under our proposal, a Centre would require a recipient
• to acknowledge the source nation´s contribution in publications and variety
descriptions
• to notify the Centre of any  transfer  of the  material or its  derivatives to  a  third
party, and to require a similar restriction  when transferring  the material to  that
third party
• to file a report on pre-breeding/evaluation results
• in the event of successful commercialization of research products deriving from
the material, to provide a reasonable share of net profits to the source  nation in
an amount and a form to be agreed upon between the recipient and that  nation.
This could be through payments, training assistance, technology transfer, or other
forms of collaboration.
• to observe the following restrictions concerning intellectual property:
(a) not to seek rights on the material itself, and
(b) not to assert rights on derivatives in the territory of the source country and
other developing countries, unless  the recipient has actually marketed  a
product containing the technology in the source country and other
developing countries within five years after issuance of such rights, or the
derived  material  traces less than one fourth of its lineage to the  material
obtained from the Centre
The recipient´s obligations should lapse after a period of, say, 30 years.
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The Centre would be required
• to notify a recipient of the name and agency of the source nation that has provided
the material, and of the possible  interest that  country may have in  the material
under the Convention on Biological Diversity.
• to track the destination of distributed germplasm to the first recipient (first-round
releases). Either periodically or upon request, the Centre would advise the source
nations of releases effected during a specified period. At the choice of the source
nation this information would be available in hardcopy or machine-readable form.
• to monitor the filing of pre-breeding/evaluation data by recipients and make them
available from its database to source nations on request.
Similarly to the recipient´s obligations, a Centre´s obligation to notify, track and monitor
should also lapse after a period of, say, 30 years. A Centre may still want to maintain
the procedures beyond such date, but should have the discretion to terminate them.
The proposed arrangements add substantial new commitments to the obligations
the Centres already have as trustees. We do not see commitments to facilitate source
country interests as interfering with their obligations as trustees: importantly, material
obtained by the Centres on the proposed conditions would still be available worldwide
for research and development. The added obligations on the Centres reflect the evolving
international understanding of trusteeship and a task whose costs the Centres will
have to bear in conducting their mission in a changing environment.
We believe that it is essential for the Centres to take a uniform approach in setting
their policies as to what restrictions to accept on material obtained in the post-Convention
era. Should any one Centre accept germplasm on terms more favourable to the source
than do others, similar terms will be demanded of all Centres and by all suppliers. It
would seem imperative that these terms be explained to and reviewed with a
representative number of source nations and user organizations before they are applied.
Individual Centres should depart from the standard terms uniformly applied by all
Centres only to the extent required by their genuinely different situations. Our analysis
focused primarily on agricultural plants. Thus, a Centre such as ICLARM and the future
international livestock development centre working with animal genetic material, or
Centres such as ICRAF and CIFOR working with material that may have agricultural
as well as medical applications, may have different needs. Only differences at this
level should lead to special rules and policies.
The proposed set of form agreements and the rules and clauses may not satisfy the
various interests involved. They may not go far enough for some developing countries,
who want to present a stronger claim for compensation and technology transfer. The
user industry may well oppose the proposed rules as too burdensome, and argue that
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they cannot use material with the proposed strings attached. Yet, both sides should
realize, that, imperfect as it is, the proposed compromise option offers benefits to both.
It will allow the breeding industry continued access to the international germplasm
collection effort; while for the source countries it levels the playing field by providing
them access to information on users and breeding results they previously did not have,
as well as facilitating compensation.
Beyond this, we realize that the future global collaboration in the exchange and
development of germplasm, on which both the South and the North depend, will only
work in a spirit of mutual understanding and fair play. Material transfer agreements can
lay the basis for this collaboration but cannot replace the spirit.
II. Introduction 1
Genetic resources are the key raw material of the international Centres and their
genebanks. These institutions collect, screen, sort, characterize, improve and distribute
these resources. They make them available to users and researchers in developing
and developed countries without restrictions. Most do not charge for the cost of handling
the material. To date they have also enjoyed unrestricted access to germplasm from
countries in both the developing and developed world.
There is broad concern that this era of free germplasm exchange is coming to a
close. On the one hand, research in the private sector is playing a growing role, and
this sector considers intellectual property protection for research products as essential
for successful commercialization.2 On the other hand, source nations, particularly
among developing countries, are asserting control and ownership rights over germplasm
found within their territories. This is a central implication of the United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity, signed at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.
1 
The authors wish to thank Leanna M. Lamola (JD 1993, Drake University Law School) for her research assistance
and Dan L. Bagatell (JD 1991, Stanford Law School) who prepared a background paper of great value under a
Rockefeller Foundation grant to Stanford Law School.
2
 For general background see W. Reid et al., Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for Sustainable
Development (World Resources Institute, 1993); E. Brandt, “Sharing of Biological Research Materials: A University
Perspective,” 1 University Int´l Prop. Rev. 1 (No. 3, Fall 1993); J. Brinton, “Biotechnology Licensing: Issues from the
University Perspective,” 16 AIPLA Q.J. 479 (1988-89); G. Karny, Biotechnology Licensing,” Licensing L. and Bus.
Rep., May-June 1985 at 1; P. Kelly & E. Jaworski, “Agreements Covering Exchanges of Biological Materials,” 3 Trends
in Biotechnology 22 (1985); C. Lipsey et al., ‘’Protecting Trade Secrets in Biotechnology,” in Practising Law Institute,
Protecting Trade Secrets (1986); B. Rowland, “Legal Implications of Letter Licenses for Biotechnology,” 1 High Tech.
L. J. 99 (1986); R. Simpson & R. Sedjo, “Contracts for Transferring Rights to Indigenous Genetic Resources,”
Resources, No. 109 (Fall 1992); J. Woodley, “The Commercial Transfer of Biotechnology -- Considerations in
Technology Licensing,” Intell. Prop. in Asia & the Pacific, July-Dec. 1989 at 19; P.S. Baenziger, R.A. Kleese, R.F.
Barnes (eds.), “Intellectual property Rights: Protection of Plant Materials”, Crop Science Society of America (1993).
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It is not the goal of this paper to contemplate whether such concerns are valid3; but
rather to consider how the international Centres should react to such concerns, so as
to have policies and instruments in hand when the need arises. Material transfer
agreements (MTAs) may be the instrument of choice to protect the legitimate interests
of the germplasm community and the Centres. Thus, the primary objective of this paper
is to explore their possible utility for the international Centres.
The paper is structured as follows: Section III reviews the current use of MTAs, by
whom and for what purpose. This is followed in Section IV by a discussion of key
provisions typically found in MTAs. Section V then reviews the legal validity and
enforceability of such agreements. The interest of the international Centres in negotiating
MTAs, specific provisions they may want to incorporate in such instruments, and their
implications for the Centres´ handling of genetic material are discussed in Section VI.
In Annex 1 we have suggested language which Centres may want to use in tailoring
agreements to cover their specific needs, and a policy statement they might want to
use in introducing these agreements. Annex 2 reviews statements on distribution policies
issued by some International Centres.
III. Purpose and Use of MTAs
A. Legal Scope
MTAs are a recent phenomenon, used in connection with the transfer of biological
materials with potential commercial significance. They can be used for transfer of material
for curation (e.g. storage in genebanks), for research, or for commercial use. Most
often material is transferred for a combination of these purposes. As agreements, they
may take a variety of forms — from letter statements accompanying a shipment: of
materials to detailed and formally negotiated contracts signed by both parties before a
transfer is made. Their provisions may similarly vary, depending on the intentions of the
parties. At one extreme, the provisions may be designed to avoid patent rights on the
material or its components; at the other extreme, they may be designed to encourage
patented inventions deriving from the material and to divide the benefits of such inventions.
As their name implies, MTAs are contractual agreements concluded between two or
more parties. As contracts they enjoy the protection of the law in many nations: failure
to perform what is promised is a breach of contract which gives one party the right to
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3
 On this subject, see, for example, C. Fowler and P. Mooney, “Shattering - Food, Politics and the Loss of Genetic
Diversity” (1990); J. Rifkin, “Biosphere Politics - A New Consciousness for a New Century” (1991); S. Kadidal,
“Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents,” 103 Yale L.J. 223 (1993); J.R. Kloppenburg, Jr.(ed.), Seeds and
Sovereignty (1988); Siebeck, W.E., D.L. Plucknett, and K. Wright-Platais (1993) “Privatization of Research Through
Intellectual Property Protection and its Potential Effects on Research at the International Centres”. in D.R. Buxton et
al. (eds.) International Crop Science I. Madison WI, 1993.
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bring action against the other party, such as suing for damages. Unlike patents or
copyrights, MTAs do not rest upon codified legal statutes defining specific rights and
obligations. Instead, reflecting freedom of contract, parties to an MTA have wide
discretion in setting the terms of their agreement and tailoring them to their specific
needs.
MTAs are generally regarded as subject to trade secret law; the material transferred
is the ´trade secret´. In those countries that protect trade secret contracts, MTAs offer
a form of intellectual property protection that can go beyond that available under patent
law. An MTA can, for example, cover material that is not patentable; it can (at least as a
matter of law) be effective for longer than the typical patent term. At the same time, it is
ineffective against independent development of similar material, and an MTA may lose
legal force once the material involved becomes significantly disseminated, whether
voluntarily or not.
In some countries, the material transferred under an MTA may also enjoy protection
against certain forms of violation by third parties. Thus, a third party who obtains the
material by theft or trickery may be liable for damages.4 However, an MTA offers no
protection against genuine independent development by a third party.
B. Who Uses MTAs
MTAs have been pioneered by industry, are increasingly being used by public sector
laboratories, particularly in the USA, and now also appear in international germplasm
exchanges, including those from developing to industrial countries.
1. Industry
MTAs are particularly useful in the biotechnology context where they typically
cover exchanges for both research and possible commercialization. The specificity of
biological materials gives them substantial value. For example, scientists from different
firms may want to exchange material containing a gene suspected of coding for a
particular physiological function, and to protect future commercial rights while allowing
research to proceed. The patent system is not helpful to them, because the precise
functions or sequence of the materials may not yet be known. Moreover, the patent
system is expensive and requires disclosure. Thus, the scientists use a contractual
arrangement which commits the parties to the exchange to confidentiality.
Among profit-oriented firms, these MTAs frequently arise in the context of cooperative
research efforts by a small group of firms to develop a specific product.
4 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, adopted in several US states, provides for damages against a party who obtains a
trade secret by “improper means,” which includes “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, and espionage through electronic or other means.” Art. 1.
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For example, a biotechnology firm collaborating with an industrial partner to develop a
new process technology may exchange materials with that partner. Their agreement,
laying out the structure of the cooperative research program, will typically authorize
the exchange of biological materials, prohibit their transfer to third parties or use for
purposes other than the collaboration, and define a mechanism for marketing the product
that is expected to derive from the research program.
In such cases, the right and responsibility of patenting the product will be carefully
spelled out, as will be the ownership rights in such a patent. These rights will generally
be exclusive, for the whole purpose of the collaboration is to develop a new proprietary
product. Often the most difficult problem is the allocation of rights to unexpected inventions
— possibly valuable in new markets — that neither firm had considered.
The situation is different in large research consortia which include a significant
portion of firms in a field. Although such consortia are often encouraged by governments,
firms are more hesitant to share technology. Being competitors rather than collaborators,
the firms will typically share only less valuable material. The logic of a consortium
makes it almost automatic that each member of the consortium will receive a
non-exclusive licence to any invention emerging from the effort. The commercial value
of such a licence is often small so that firms may not attempt to obtain patents on such
material. Such consortia tend to focus on relatively basic research, or on research that
can benefit all members and for which costs can therefore be shared.
2. Public Sector Laboratories
Non-profit institutions such as government and some academic laboratories
have a very different interest in MTAs. In some relatively traditional institutions, the
institution desires primarily to ensure that the material remains in the public domain,
while making sure that its association with the material is recognized. Thus, a national
agricultural research institution may give a firm a non-exclusive right to use and multiply
its material provided that certain quality standards are met and the material is identified
as deriving from the public institution. In other cases, the institution may seek to require
that the recipient not restrict access to use of the material or patent inventions (e.g.
natural genes) that may derive from the material.
Two factors are leading public-sector research institutions to adopt different
strategies. One is the sense that exclusivity may be desirable, and in fact necessary,
to ensure that the material can actually be commercialized; this exclusivity may be
most readily obtained through patents or other forms of intellectual property protection.
This was the rationale behind the US legislation encouraging public sector institutions
and grantees to file for intellectual property protection on their inventions.5 Experience
MATERIAL TRANSFER AGREEMENTS IN GENETIC RESOURCES EXCHANGE    13
5
E.g. the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-210; and the Stevenson-WydIer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-14.
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had shown that firms would not use public sector inventions unless they could obtain a
form of exclusivity that would recompense the costs involved in taking a public sector
invention to the market. These costs (arising after the basic invention) are sometimes
substantial. They include, for example, the development of large-scale production
methods (scaling-up), testing to satisfy regulatory requirements and the support of a
network of distributors.
Once this approach was in place, however, the public sector institutions and,
particularly, universities, began to look to inventions as a basis for royalties. Since
research materials often embody important commercial value, they would treat their
transfer much the same as a transfer of patent rights. Thus, a university might give a
new plant variety to industry on the basis of a full-scale, negotiated marketing agreement
that includes specific royalty provisions. Where the value of the material is unclear,
because it is not itself a marketable product but might be a major component of such a
product, the university might provide the material under an agreement that would attempt
to give it the right to negotiate for a share of the profits in products that derived from the
material. In some cases, the university might seek ´reach-through royalties,´ i.e. a
percentage share of sales or profits from any products that might be developed through
use of the transferred material (e.g. an important reagent) as a research tool. In some
of these cases, the university set too high a price and, in effect, priced itself out of the
market.
3. International Germplasm Exchange
Following the practice of US corporations who routinely insist on using formal
MTAs when transferring genetic material outside the USA, MTAs are beginning to be
used by industry in Europe and Japan also in domestic and international exchanges.
Form agreements in use appear to follow US precedents.
Public institutions outside the USA are also beginning to introduce form agreements
to limit or preclude commercial use of material, or make it subject to a separate licensing
agreement. These initiatives seem to be driven by the intention to comply with the
provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity.6 At least one developing country
has issued guidelines on germplasm exchange with foreign institutions.7
6
Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, UK, through a recently introduced policy, will control exploitation of genetic material
it collects following the coming into force of the Biodiversity Convention. Commercialization will be subject to a
licensing agreement. Kew intends to remit half of the licensing fee to the source country, or to an international fund
should such a fund be set up under the Biodiversity Convention. (Linington, pers. communication).
7
Guidelines issued by the Turkish Plant Genetic Resources Research Institute specifically require recipients to
provide feedback data and publication credit, and reserve the right to patents on the material for the Government of
Turkey.
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C. Attempts at Formalizing Access to Germplasm
For some time efforts have been underway to formalize the exchange of genetic
material. These have recently been boosted by international initiatives to codify the
exchange of such material, especially in the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).8
1. International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm Collecting And Transfer
(FAO)
In its recently approved ´International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm
Collection and Transfer´ FAO has set rules for plant exploration and collection.9 The
Code is voluntary but likely to provide the basis for collecting missions to developing
countries. It recognizes nations´ “sovereign rights over plant genetic resources in their
territories” while encouraging them not to “unduly restrict” access to these resources. It
sets out responsibilities of collectors, donors, curators, sponsors and users of
germplasm, including procedures and rules for granting collectors´ permits, and the
need to deposit duplicates with the host country upon completion of a collection mission.
Curators are, in particular, to “take practical steps, inter alia by the use of material
transfer agreements” to promote the objectives of the code, “including the sharing of
benefits derived from collected germplasm by the users with the local communities,
farmers and host countries.”
As possible forms of compensation the Code enumerates (Art. 14)
“(a) facilitating access to new, improved varieties and other products, on mutually
agreed terms;
(b) support for research of relevance to conservation and utilization of plant genetic
resources, including community-based, conventional and new technologies,
as well as conservation strategies, for both ex situ and in situ conservation;
8
For a discussion of the Biodiversity Convention see Section VI.A.2.b (page 28 below). The Commission of the
European Union has prepared a draft decree aiming at better conservation, description and utilization of agrogenetic
resources already available in member states. Collecting of new material would be limited to the territory of member
states. Objectives are to establish an inventory of material collected (including the setting up of a databank); induce
coordination among member states; and help rationalize existing collections (reduce duplicate storage). A standing
committee of member states would ensure information flow and exchange of germplasm. The draft decree, at this
point, does not set rules for such exchange. (Doc Com(93)337 fin. dated September 7, 1993).
9
FAO Conference document C 93/REP/5 dated December 1993 (Draft Report - Part 5 - from Commission l,)
Twenty-seventh Session of the FAO Conference, Rome, 6-25 November 1993.
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(c) training, at both the institutional  and farmer  levels, to enhance local skills in
genetic resources conservation, evaluation, development,  propagation  and
use;
(d) facilitate the transfer of appropriate technology  for the conservation and use
of plant genetic resources;
(e) support for programmes to evaluate and enhance local landraces and other
indigenous germplasm, so as to encourage the optimal  use of plant  genetic
resources at national, subnational, and farmers´ and community level and to
encourage conservation;
(f) any other appropriate support for farmers and communities for conservation
of indigenous germplasm of the type collected by the mission, and
(g) scientific and technical information obtained from the germplasm.”
2. U.S.A. National Institutes of Health (NIH)
Uncertainty over the legal validity of provisions in some MTAs, particularly
more extreme´ reach-through royalty´ provisions, gave rise to pressures in the United
States to develop a more balanced form agreement for government sponsored research.
Since 1990, the U.S.A. National Institutes of Health (NIH), in cooperation with other
government agencies, universities, hospitals, research institutes, and the biotech and
pharmaceutical industry, has developed a set of three form agreements. Drafts are
currently undergoing a final review and are expected to be published in the NIH Guide.10
The three form agreements are designed for the following situations:
• a simple letter agreement for the transfer  between  non-profit  institutions  of
biological material that does not have obvious commercial value
• a Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA) for use  between
non-profit institutions
• a UBMTA for transfer of biological material from industry to non-profit institutions.
The first two agreements represent reasonably balanced terms for transfer of
materials from one non-profit institution to another. The third sets out similar terms
under which the commercial provider of the material could be granted a licence to an
invention resulting from the recipient´s research. Reflecting their origin, the three formats
are designed for the transfer of medically rather than agriculturally oriented materials.
10 August 1993 drafts are available in J. Brinton, ´Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement(s),’ AUTM Manual,
Part IX; Chapter 2 (Association of University Technology Managers, 1993).
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The UBMTAs extend their coverage to ´derivatives´ defined as substances
genetically derived from the supplied material including modifications that are not
obviously distinct from the supplied material. They do not provide for reach-through
royalties on inventions and modification that go beyond the so defined derivatives.11
All three agreements require signature by both parties before material will be released.
An earlier proposal, to establish relatively detailed umbrella agreements that could be
referenced by a simple exchange of letters for a specific transfer of materials, was
dropped.
3. U.S.A. National Cancer Institute (NCI)
For screening in its drug discovery program, the National Cancer Institute
(NCI) annually procures some 6000 samples of plants, marine organisms and microbes
from developing countries. Under its letter-of-collection agreement, NCI “recognizes
the need to compensate source country organizations and peoples in the event of
commercialization of a drug developed from an organism collected”. NCI regularly files
for patents on active agents isolated, and licenses them to pharmaceutical companies
for production and marketing. The licensee is required to enter into an agreement with
the source country on compensation.12 NCI also offers its help, to transfer knowledge,
expertise and technology related to drug discovery and development to the source
country, to train its scientists and to collaborate with source country institutions in the
discovery and development process.
NCI does not itself negotiate a licensing fee as part of its agreement with the
pharmaceutical company, and leaves the determination of the compensation to
negotiations between the source country and the licensee. No dispute has yet arisen
where a source country and licensee could not agree on the level of compensation,
and it remains to be seen whether in that case NCI could maintain a hands-off attitude.
11 See discussion under IV.C (page 20).
12 “Should the agent eventually be licensed to a pharmaceutical company for production and marketing, DTP/NCI
will require the successful licensee to negotiate and enter into agreement(s) with the appropriate Source Country
Government agency(ies). This agreement will address the concern on the part of the Source Country Government
that pertinent agencies, institutions and/or persons receive royalties and other forms of compensation, as appropriate.”
(§ 12 NCI Letter-of-Collection Agreement)
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4. US Department of Agriculture - Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS)
To comply with international agreements such as the Convention on Biological
Diversity, the US National Plant Germplasm System (NPGS) is currently reviewing its
policy of free distribution of genetic material.13 According to one proposal, NPGS would,
at the request of countries that place their genetic material in the NPGS, attach an
identifier to such material. Material currently deposited in the NPGS would continue to
be freely available, while material with a ´Source Recognition´ (SR) identifier would
only be released on condition that the recipient not distribute the material, that it credit
the source country in publications, and that it enter into an agreement with the source
country on the use of the material and fairly compensate the source country in case of
commercial gain from the material or its derivatives, and that it provide NPGS with
evaluation data on the material.
Recipients of material so identified would have to agree in writing to conform with
these conditions. Upon request, NPGS would notify a source nation of releases of SR
material, but would leave it to that nation to pursue possible claims against the recipient.
NPGS would not act as agent or collector for the source nation. NPGS´ advanced data
management facility, the Genetic Resources Information Network (GRIN), is expected
to handle the additional data-processing requirements resulting from operating the
proposed two-tier system.
5. Private Sector Initiatives
A novel arrangement was concluded in 1991 between Merck & Co., the largest
US pharmaceutical producer, and Costa Rica Biodiversity Institute (INBio). Under the
agreement, INBio, a publicly chartered non-profit organization, will provide Merck against
payment of $1.35 million and provision of field equipment, with an unspecified number
of probes (plants, insects, microbes) at Merck´s choice over a period of two years.
Merck has the right to patent inventions it makes from Costa Rican material, and will
pay INBio an undisclosed percentage of sales revenues. INBio intends to use the
proceed in its ongoing Biodiversity program.
Such arrangements, of interest to countries rich in biological diversity such as Costa
Rica, offer the potential of adding value to genetic material by developing the
infrastructure to collect, screen, characterize and store germplasm.
Reflecting the negotiating pattern of the Merck-INBio arrangements, the World
Resources Institute (WRI) has developed a model contract for Biodiversity prospecting
18   ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES No. 1
13.
Sec. 1632(a)(4) of Public Law 101-624 of November 28, 1990: “The Secretary [of Agriculture], ... shall (4) make
available upon request, without charge and without regard to the country from which such request originates, the
genetic material which the programme assembles.”
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to be concluded between pharmaceutical companies and a developing country.14 The
model contract provides for an initial collection fee, and a royalty on pharmaceutical
products that may be derived from the genetic material taken from the developing country.
IV.  Typical Provisions of Material Transfer Agreements
This section reviews clauses typically found in MTAs.
A. Use Permitted ‘For Research Purposes Only’
Probably the most common pattern in the non-profit sector in industrial countries
are agreements that permit the free use of materials for ́ research purposes,´15 with the
possible implication that there is an obligation to negotiate a division of royalties should
commercial products become obtainable from the materials. This pattern is typical when
the provider of materials is willing to provide the material for scientific purposes, but
wants to protect all possible commercial rights.
The exact meaning of ´research purposes´ has not been fully clarified.16 Although
little has been written in this area, at least one commentator17 takes such research to
include not only research oriented toward purely academic purposes but also research
oriented ultimately toward product development. This interpretation is supported by the
basic logic of such an agreement: One who takes the material for research use with an
obligation to negotiate royalties in the event of commercial use should be allowed to
carry out research up to the point of commercialization, at which point royalties must
be paid. In case of a public sector recipient, such as an agricultural research university,
distribution for use by farmers would be the equivalent of commercialization and the
recipient´s obligations in such a situation should be spelled out; research prior to that
point would certainly be permitted under such an agreement.
14 Downes, D. et al. Biodiversity Prospecting Contract in: Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for
Sustainable Development, World Resources Institute, 1993.
15 E.g. ‘’The Biological Material will be used for research purposes only”. NIH draft letter UBMTA for non-profit to
non-profit transfer, article 2.
16 The issue is not the same as that involved in the research exemption in patent law. That exemption is a right to
use a patented invention for certain (generally academic) research purposes and follows statutory or case law
criteria. Here, the issue is the interpretation to be given to a term frequently used in a contract. The parties could, if
they chose, insert a detailed definition of their choice.
17 B. Rowland, ‘Legal Implications of Letter Licenses for Biotechnology,’ 1 High Tech. L. J. 99 (1986).
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B. Obligation to Share Royalties or Profits
Although it is possible (and typical in some commercial contexts) that a transfer
agreement would precisely specify a distribution of the profits from commercial use of
the materials transferred, the more common pattern is to leave the negotiation of this
distribution to take place later in the event that there are profits.18  Mainly because few
MTAs have yet led to commercial products, there has been no judicial interpretation of
these clauses. Some have undoubtedly led to agreements. One alleged verbal
agreement led to a dispute settled out of court.19
A duty to negotiate will not necessarily lead to an agreement. No one can predict the
bargaining power that the two parties will have in such a negotiation. But the existence
of a vaguely defined obligation to negotiate may deter a firm from making substantial
investments to commercialize a product unless it is more precisely defined. At the time
of the initial transfer, however, it is normally impossible to define a reasonable royalty,
especially in situations where a product may be derived from materials obtained from
more than one source. To meet such situations, agreements often include arbitration
procedures to define a reasonable royalty, should the parties be unable to do so.
C. Derivative Material
Of importance in an MTA is the scope of the subject matter covered by it, on which
the provider seeks to protect its rights. In addition to the supplied material itself, such
protection normally extends to its derivatives.
However, to determine what is a derivative and what is not, is often difficult, yet
critical. Consider the example of a gene found within a specimen supplied by a genebank.
The terms of the agreement apply to the natural genes found within the specimen. But
what if the recipient wishes to patent or use commercially what is essentially the same
gene, but with the codons modified to improve expression in a different host? What if
the gene found in the supplied material is not itself patented but is used as a probe to
identify a similar gene in another species which is then patented? It is relatively easy to
negotiate in advance an answer to such questions, but failure to face them then can
lead to serious later dispute.
The typical approach to this problem is to negotiate a definition of ́ derived product´
and to make the commitments of the MTA apply to such derived products as well as to
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18 E.g. “If RECIPIENT desires to use the MATERIAL or Modifications for ... profit-making or commercial purposes,
RECIPIENT agrees, in advance of such use, to negotiate in good faith with PROVIDER to establish the terms of a
commercial license. It is understood by RECIPIENT that PROVIDER shall have no obligation to grant such a license
to RECIPIENT, and may grant exclusive or non-exclusive commercial licenses to others”. NIH draft UBMTA,
nonprofit to non-profit, art. 5 (b).
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Hoffman-LaRoche v. Golde, No. 80-3601-AJZ (N.D. Cal, filed Sept. 11, 1980).
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the supplied material itself. Thus, genes or portions of genes found in progeny of the
supplied material might be covered by the MTA, while new products found by using the
material as a reagent might not.
Although the obligation to negotiate royalties thus applies only to inventions deriving
directly from the transferred material, some agreements attempt to ´reach-through´
and secure royalties on a broader category of products.20 Such provisions have
frequently been found unacceptable by recipients; there may also be questions as to
their legal validity under competition law.
D. Obligation Not to Seek Patents
Another provision that might be included in an MTA prevents patenting of the
transferred material or of certain kinds of derived products.21 Many genebanks might
like, for example, to supply material under terms that prohibit protection of the transferred
material, or of genes found in it. This can be done by provisions that state, for example,
that the recipient shall take no measures to patent the material, or genes found in the
material. Commercial recipients interested in locating and developing such genes, may,
of course, be unwilling to accept the material under such conditions. In those cases in
which the material is fully characterized, publication would, of course, prevent patenting
of the material itself. In order to prevent the patenting of genes isolated from material
supplied by a genebank, it would, however, be necessary that the relevant genes had
been sequenced and the relevant genetic data published as well. If this has not been
done, only an MTA clause can bar the recipient from patenting.22
A patent obtained in violation of such an agreement would almost certainly not be,
for that reason, invalid. The supplier of the material would, however, be able to obtain
damages for breach of the promise not to patent, and would also be able to obtain a
compulsory, royalty-free licence to use the material. These points follow from the law
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20 E.g., in the case of a culture of a disease organism, “The recipient’s obligation to pay royalties to the provider of
this culture shall extend to any products produced that may in any way use the transferred organism. This shall
include resistant organisms that have been identified by use of the transferred organism”.
21 E.g. “Recipient will not patent the transferred material or any material or gene derived from it”.
22 United States law provides a procedure,” Statutory Invention Registration, ”35 U.S.C. §157, under which a patent
like registration can be used to keep an invention in the public domain and protect the inventor against another’s later
independent invention. There have been no cases under this provision, and it is not clear when use of this provision
is preferable to publication.
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governing the parallel situation in which an employee obtains a patent after making a
valid contract to transfer patent rights to his or her employer.23
E. Obligation to Share Intellectual Property Rights
An alternative approach to patent rights is suggested by the commercial practice
found in the small-group product-oriented research cooperation described earlier.24
Because partners in such collaboration expect patentable results to arise from their
collaboration and the exchange of material, they will generally agree from the outset
how to allocate rights. One party might, for instance, receive exclusive rights in one
market, while the other party might receive rights in another market. Or the parties
might divide royalties evenly or in proportion to their research investments.
F. Obligation to Grant a Licence (Grant-Back Clause)
Private sector research groups are frequently concerned with protecting their
competitive position in the event that the recipient of the material develops a patent or
makes a related invention. Under a ́ grant-back´clause, some providers seek to ensure
the right to use such patented inventions.25
 
In this way, they protect their competitive
position in the event that the licensee develops a major improvement. The detailed
analysis of these provisions can be complex; in some cases, they have given rise to
concerns under competition law, arising from fears that they may be used to extend a
provider´s dominant market position.
G. Mutual Assistance
MTAs frequently include provisions designed to prevent access to the material by
third parties, so as to make sure that the material does not reach parties not bound by
the confidentiality commitments. Such provisions may, for instance, require the recipient
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23 “The basic starting point in the law of employee/employer patent rights [in the United States] is the principle that
the inventor owns the patent rights even though the invention was conceived and/or reduced to practice while the
inventor was employed. Three caveats apply to this general rule. The first is that an express contract between the
parties can vest ownership in the employer [in many nations]. Secondly, the employer will have ownership if the
employee was specifically hired to exercise his inventive faculties. Finally, even if the employer does not have
ownership rights in the invention, he may still have a non-exclusive, nontransferable royalty-free license (‘shop right’)
to use the patented invention,” P. Van SIyke & M. Friedman, ‘Employer’s Rights to Inventions and Patents of Its
Officers, Directors and Employees,’ 18 AIPLA Qtly. J 127,132 (1990). (Some nations regulate the allocation of patent
rights between employees and employers.)
24 See section III.B.1 (page 12).
25 “Recipient will give provider a non-exclusive, royalty-free license under any inventions it may patent that derive
from the transferred material or improvements or derivatives thereof’’.
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to separate research activities on the transferred material from other research, and to
introduce control procedures to restrict the number of staff that will have access to it.
H. Deferment of Publications and Reporting Obligations to Facilitate Patenting
lf patents are expected to result from research on the transferred material, MTAs
may stipulate that intended publications based on the material be deferred for a stated
time (typically one to three months) so that patent rights can be protected by application
in the interim. The agreement may also require parties to report to each other on any
actions they may take with respect to patents so as to protect their mutual rights to
royalties, and to facilitate patent applications in case the nonpatenting party has
information needed in the application.
I. Acknowledgement
It is common, especially in the academic context, to require the recipient to provide
acknowledgement — the equivalent of a literature citation — of the contributions of the
material supplied, in connection with any publication that may result from use of the
material.26
J. Warranties
A final category of typical terms concerns liabilities that may be associated with the
material. This is particularly important with respect to transgenic material, where the
supplier does not want to be liable for the recipient´s failure to obtain appropriate biosafety
clearance. The recipient should normally be under an obligation to obtain such approval
and indemnify the supplier in the event of such problems. MTAs may also include
guarantees that the materials are not covered by patents, or conversely, disclaim any
liability in the event that they infringe a third party´s patent.
V. Legal Validity and Enforceability of MTAs
A. Enforceability
Although there have been no cases turning on the validity of an MTA, such an
agreement (if accepted by both parties) is enforceable in countries that respect trade
secret law. In the USA, this is laid down in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. A possible
general exception could arise from competition law that restricts use of private
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agreements to achieve intellectual property goals far beyond those created by statutes
such as the patent and copyright acts.27 Of the clauses discussed above, the one
most likely to be challenged on these grounds would be a very broad ´reach-through´
clause demanded by a holder of material considered very valuable.
Some developing nations have traditionally restricted trade secrecy provisions both
because of antitrust concerns just described and fears that trade secrecy provisions
limit public access to inventions and thus give the public less than does the patent
system. Brazil, for example, has experimented with a system under which trade secrets
would be made public five years after the date of the agreement, a proposal strongly
resisted by those considering the transfer of technology to Brazil under a trade secret
agreement. In addition, the terms of the trade secret and confidentiality agreements
that employers can require from their employees are often regulated.
However, the current trend in developing nations is to move toward stronger
enforcement of trade secret agreements. Mexico, for example, has just shifted to full
protection. The terms of the intellectual property section of the Uruguay Round will
require recognition of trade secret agreements. 28
B. Prior Agreement vs. Letter Included with Material
A difficult question — especially because of its implications for the administrative
costs of implementing MTAs — is whether, in order to be legally enforceable, the MTA
has to be signed by both parties prior to the transfer of the genetic material, or whether
a simple letter included with the transferred material is sufficient to establish an
enforceable agreement. This letter would state the terms on which the transfer is
conducted, and include a statement such as ‘’By retaining the material, recipient agrees
to the terms of this letter agreement”.
27 Thus, in Kewanee Oil Co. vs. Bicron Corp., 416 US 470 (1974), the US Supreme Court considered whether a
state´s trade secret law violated the federal patent law policy favouring the disclosure of inventions. lt analyzed the
issue carefully before upholding the state trade secret law.
28 Article 39, paragraph 2, of the ´Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods´ (the TRIPS Agreement) proposed within the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations states:
“Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within their control from
being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial
practices so long as such information:
. is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components,
generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of
information in question;
. has commercial value because it is secret; and
. has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information,
to keep it secret’’.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, doc. MTN/FA, 15 December
1993.
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In general, the terms of such a letter agreement would establish the contractual
relationship, unless the recipient proposes terms which ´materially´ differ from those
contained in the letter agreement. lf they do, the recipient´s response, even if it is worded
as acceptance (“I accept your offer on the following conditions”), is considered as a
new offer, to be accepted or rejected by the original offeror. Public policy considerations,
such as consumer protection, have influenced legislation and jurisprudence in various
countries.
In the USA, if the acceptance of such a letter is contested, the courts are divided on
the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.29
The terms of the letter are more likely to be seen as accepted if the shipper allows for
the return of the supplied material and the recipient if s/he fails to understand the precise
terms of the letter does not make use of this possibility. They are also more likely to be
held up within a community whose members are aware of their respective trading
practices and policies. In civil law countries, legislation and jurisprudence tend to interpret
such agreements as validly concluded.30
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29 In evaluating the force of such a letter, courts are likely to turn to § 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, whose
first two paragraphs state:
“(1)A definite and reasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable
time operates as an acceptance even though it: states terms additional to or different from those offered or
agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such
terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of
them is received”.
In applying this provision, the recipient’s request for the material is interpreted as an offer, and the cover letter as
its acceptance or confirmation that may include terms restricting the recipient’s use of the material. Form
language in the cover letter may attempt to make acceptance expressly conditional on the recipient’s assent to
these restrictions. The fundamental question then becomes whether these restrictions are ‘material’. Although
many of the disputes interpreting this section involve issues such as whether an agreement to arbitrate is a
material alteration, one recent case involved interpretation of the liability limitations that were contained in a
software package and were meant to be effective upon opening that package. The court rejected these limitations
and decided in favour of the buyer, Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. vs. The Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp 759 (DC
Ariz. 1993).
30 Under French law, for example, the general principle (as in Anglo-Saxon law) is that silence is not acceptance.
But, reflecting the emphasis of Article 1108 of the French Civil Code on consent of the party to be bound (rather than
on offer and acceptance), the exceptions can be rather flexibly stated and can arise through professional customs
and ongoing business relationships, F. Chabas, Leçons de Droit Civil 123-25 (7iéme éd., 1985). Thus, if well publicized
within the relevant community, a provider’s policy can be enforced through a simple transmittal letter.
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The situation would be less clear in disputes that arise the Convention for the nternational
Sale of Goods.31
C. Monitoring Requirements
There is no legal requirement for the provider of the materials to verify whether the
recipient is living up to obligations included in the agreement; enforceability does not
depend on vigilance. Of course, rights not exercised become meaningless in practice
— without some form of monitoring or tracking, an MTA may be effectively meaningless.
VI. The Case of the International Centres
A. The Demise of the Free-Flow Paradigm?
1. Germplasm Exchange Under the Free-Flow Rule
Because the use of plant genetic resources is central to their mission, the
international Centres have traditionally subscribed to a policy of free exchange of
germplasm.32 Germplasm from their collections is freely available to scientists in the
public and private sectors throughout the world, who can use it without restrictions, for
research or commercially. There is an expectation, based on rules of ethics, that the
recipient will reciprocate in kind, if a Centre asks for material, and few seem to be the
cases where reciprocity has been denied. This has been the rule in Centre relations
with partner institutions in both developing and developed countries.
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Germany passed a law in 1976 to contain the broad interpretation until then given by courts to the presumptive
application of statements of policies and general conditions to business deals with non-merchants (´Gesetz zur
Regelung der AlIgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen’ of December 9, 1976, BGBI. 1, 3317). According to §2(I), general
conditions set by one party will rule relations between parties if the issuer advises recipient of the existence of such
conditions at the time the contract is concluded; (2) recipient has the possibility of taking note of the conditions; and
(3) agrees with them. While (1) and (2) have to be proven by the issuer, implicit agreement on (3) is presumed if the
recipient does not object (Palandt, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 52. Auflage, Anmerkung 4 zu §2
AGB). By contrast, within the trading community, the onus to prove that recipient was unaware of conditions and did
not have access to them is reversed. Applied to a recipient of Centre material, even if we assume that s/he is
considered a ‘non-merchant’, notifying the policy statement to a recipient at least once, and referring to it in subsequent
transmittal letters would be sufficient to make them part of the contract.
31 Article 19 (2) states: “...a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additional or different
terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue
delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not so object the terms of the
contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance”. (United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, entered into force January 1, 1988.) Although this would seem to
favour the provider (acceptor) more than does its analogue under the US Uniform Commercial Code, the provision
goes on to provide a broad definition of material alteration; under this broad definition, typical provisions of an MTA
would almost certainly be held material.
32 TAC Document AGR/TAC:IAR/88/4 ‘CGIAR Policy on Plant Genetic Resources’, Rome, February 1988.
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There has been little interference with the free-flow rule from regulatory authorities.
Except for phytosanitary controls and quarantine regulations, the international Centres
have usually been able to exchange and distribute germplasm unimpeded by
government controls. Countries generally, and often routinely, permitted collecting
missions, in which Centres, as a matter of policy, invited local scientists to participate
and provided samples of collected material for storage at a local facility.
Also intellectual property protection to date has not affected the exchange of
germplasm by the Centres. International research collaboration sponsored by the
Centres, based on the free exchange of germplasm, and bringing together the world´s
best expertise in plant breeding, provided the basis for the Green Revolution, and
accomplished, without patents or plant breeders´ rights, one of the great technological
breakthroughs of modern days.
2. Towards a Controlled Exchange of Germplasm
Understandably then, the international Centres are little inclined to abandon
the free-flow paradigm. They have a lot to lose, and probably little to gain. Moreover,
there is a strong argument that for food crops, at least, a free-flow regime is to the
benefit of developing nations. But trade rules are changing: countries, particularly the
suppliers of germplasm among developing countries, are beginning to assert sovereign
control over their germplasm resources; while industry in developed countries claims
intellectual property rights over improvements of plant germplasm achieved through
breeding or biotechnological manipulations.
a. International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources
Efforts have been underway for some time to internationally codify the
access to, and use of, plant genetic resources. In 1983, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) established the International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources´.33 Essentially, this was an attempt, through international
conservation efforts, to stop or slow the rapid and uncontrolled disappearance of crop
plant species resulting from genetic erosion.
The International Undertaking originally subscribed to the rule of free exchange of
plant genetic resources which it recognized as ´a heritage of mankind´. In subsequent
years, however, disagreement over the scope of intellectual property protection, and
specifically over whether breeder´s lines and material protected by plant breeders´
rights - under the rule of the Undertaking - should be available without restriction, led to
33 Resolution 8/83 of the Twenty-second Session of the FAO Conference, Rome, 5-23 November 1983. In 1990, the
USA joined the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources which administers the Undertaking, but has not signed
the Undertaking.
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a narrowing of the free exchange principle. In 1989, FAO adopted two resolutions34
providing an ́ agreed interpretation´ according to which plant breeders´ rights were not
incompatible with the Undertaking, meaning that such materials remained outside the
Undertaking. In exchange for this concession to industrial countries, developing
countries won endorsement of the concept of farmers´ rights.35 Farmers´ rights are not
individual rights in a legal sense, but a moral commitment by the industrial countries to
reward “the enormous contribution that farmers of all regions have made to the
conservation and development of plant genetic resources”. However, a multilateral
system to compensate farmers and farming communities for their contributions was
never put in place.
The 1989 ´agreed interpretations´ on farmers´ rights and plant breeders´ rights
marked the first time that a quid-pro-quo rationale was explicitly introduced into the
discussion on access to germplasm. In 1991, the free-flow principle was further qualified
through another resolution36 which, while still recognizing the common heritage principle,
subordinated it “to the sovereignty of the states over their plant genetic resources”. The
same resolution anticipates further limitations of the free availability rule to come, by
declaring that “conditions of access to plant genetic resources need further clarification”.
b. The Convention on Biological Diversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992 represents an attempt to
establish a blueprint for the preservation of the world´s biological resources, including
those of agriculture. While recognizing the intrinsic value of biological diversity of all life
forms, and the critical importance of conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic
resources, the Convention requires developed and developing countries to conserve
and manage their biological resources; formally recognizes sovereign control by
individual nations over biological resources on their territories but requires countries to
facilitate access to genetic resources; requires industrial countries to allow and facilitate
access to their technologies on mutually agreed terms, but recognizes the primacy of
intellectual property protection as the limiting factor in such releases; and provides a
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34 Resolutions 4/89 and 5/89 adopted by the Twenty-fifth Session of the FAO Conference, Rome, 11-29 November,
1989 and incorporated into the International Undertaking as Annexes I and II, respectively.
35 “Farmers’ rights mean rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving,
improving, and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centers of origin/diversity. These
rights are vested in the International Community, as trustee for present and future generations of farmers..”. (Resolutions
5/89 ibid).
36 Resolution 3/91 adopted by the Twenty-sixth Session of the FAO Conference, Rome, 9-28 November 1991 (now
Annex 3 to the International Undertaking)
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financial mechanism, to be subscribed to primarily by the developed countries, to fund
developing country expenses on conservation and access to technology.
The Convention distinguishes genetic resources already collected from those that
will be collected in accordance with the Convention. Article 15.3 limits sovereign rights
to genetic resources to those which a country of origin provides, or other countries
acquire, in accordance with the Convention. Article 2 defines the ´country of origin´ as
the country which possesses those genetic resources in in situ conditions. Thus the
Convention effectively creates no obligations with respect to genetic material collected
prior to coming into force of the Convention (even if that material is stored in an
international Centre within the territory of the country of origin). On the other hand, any
material collected on or after December 29, 1993, when the Convention entered into
force, in a country that: has become a party to the Convention, will be subject to the
national sovereignty provisions of the Convention.
In the wake of the negotiations of the Convention on Biological Diversity several
countries have begun developing policies on the release of germplasm.
c. The TRIPS Agreement of the Uruguay Round
While developing countries´ demands for control over their genetic
resources grew stronger in FAO and in the negotiations leading up to the Convention
on Biological Diversity, negotiations advanced in parallel for stronger protection of man-
made improvements and inventions. From the outset, strengthened protection of
intellectual property in developing countries was a key objective advanced by the
industrial nations in the recently completed GATT Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, known as the Uruguay Round. For a long time, developing countries
opposed those demands, but  because of the trading benefits they expected to obtain
in other areas of the trade pact, and also because many of them, of their own interest,
began to move towards stronger protection of intellectual property, developing countries
relented and agreed to submit to the ́ Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights´ (the TRIPS Code) which goes far beyond what developing countries previously
had been ready to accept under international agreements. The TRIPS Code37 requires
countries:
• to protect trade secrets (Art. 39);
• to protect any invention (process or product) in all fields of technology (Art 27);
• to protect varieties. Countries can exempt plants from ́ patentable subject-matter´
but have to protect varieties, either through patents or a sui generis system
(Art 27 (3));
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• to provide enforcement procedures (Arts. 41-49).
To bring their legislation into compliance with these commitments, the Code grants
developing countries a grace period of five years which on certain conditions can be
extended by another five years, and for least developed countries by ten years (Arts.
65-66).
Implications for genetic resources management by individual developing countries
under the Code commitments remain to be assessed. With strengthened national
protection of intellectual property, countries with a growing indigenous breeding and
research capability will have broader control over improved material, in addition to the
control that the Convention on Biological Diversity grants them over their native
germplasm. By contrast, countries with no such capacity are less likely to see benefits
from protecting intellectual property.
d. Responses of the CGIAR
The international Centres are caught in this thrust towards greater control
over genetic resources. Being too small a player to stem the trend they may have to
adjust.
For some time, policy reviews and discussions within the Centres´ community have
reflected the growing concerns with which these developments are viewed. Several
initiatives were launched in response.
In 1982, the CGIAR began looking at the possible effects of intellectual property
rights on its germplasm operations. Efforts at different stages involved its Technical
Advisory Committee and its Centre Directors, and helped the Group to rationalize the
legal basis for its germplasm holdings, to establish preliminary principles on intellectual
property management, and to set tentative rules on how it expected users to handle
germplasm distributed by a Centre. A brief review of the discussions follows which led
to the adoption of a working paper by the CGIAR donors in May 1992.
Upon recommendation of TAC, the CGIAR in 1988 adopted its current policy on
Plant Genetic Resources,38 determining that its Centres hold their germplasm collections
in trust and defining among attendant Centre obligations the duty to distribute germplasm
freely for research purposes.
In November 1990, a workshop convened by ICRISAT and the CGIAR Secretariat
reviewed the need for observing intellectual property in Centre operations. The resulting
report contained recommendations for restrictions in germplasm distribution from Centre
genebanks and their breeding and research programmes. Specifically, it proposed that
all germplasm releases by Centres be covered by agreements. While all germplasm
38 TAC Docurnent AGR/TAC:IAR/88/4 ´CGIAR Policy on Plant Genetic Resources´, Rorne, February 1988; ´CGIAR
Policy on Plant Genetic Resources´. 1989. IBPGR, Rome.
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should remain ́ readily available´ on a non-discriminatory basis, the workshop suggested
that in order to protect access, landraces and wild taxa be distributed under what it
called ́ creative agreements´ for the distribution of such germplasm (without specifying,
however, what such agreements should provide for). All other material would be
distributed under MTAs requiring recipients to use the material only for research, and
also requiring that this restriction be attached to any further distribution of the material
and its derivatives, while any commercial use would require a prior licence.39
At a meeting in The Hague in September 1991, the Centre Directors´ ad hoc Working
Group on Intellectual Property recommended adoption of a policy to ensure that
developing countries share in financial benefits obtained by the private sector from
commercializing genetic material provided to CGIAR Centres by developing countries.
Concerned that the use of MTAs might weaken the free flow of genetic resources, the
Working Group, nonetheless, recognized that without such agreements it would be
difficult to ensure that such profits would be shared. Specifically, it proposed that with
respect to genetic resources and other research products, the Centres should transfer
materials only under an agreement which reserves the right to a share of any commercial
returns arising in the developed countries. Recipients should be required to negotiate
with the Centre a share of profits to be returned to the Centre which the Centre would
apply to conservation and use of genetic resources in developing counties. The Centre
should also ensure that innovations deriving from the material become available on a
royalty-free basis for use by the Centres (plural) and in the developing world.
At Centres´ Week in October 1991, the Centre Directors issued ´Suggested
Principles for a Future CGIAR Policy on Intellectual Property Rights´40 in which they
confirmed the CGIAR´s adherence to the principle of unrestricted availability of its
plant genetic resources. The principles spelt out conditions in which Centres would or
would not seek intellectual property for themselves (never on ´naturally occurring
genes´, and on other products only exceptionally in order to ensure access to
technology, without, however, seeking financial gains), but was silent on user´s rights
to seek intellectual property protection on genetic resources obtained from a Centre.
39 Managing Intellectual Property at the International Agricultural Research Centres. Summary Report of a Workshop
on Consequences of Intellectual Property Rights for the International Agricultural Research Centres, held at ICRISAT
19-21 Nov 1990, ICRISAT, 1991.
40 These Principles were re-issued with minor modifications by a Centre Directors´ meeting in June 1992. The Inter-
Centre Working Group on Genetic Resources (ICWG-PR) which consists of the heads of Centre genebanks,
recently also proposed a number of elements to be included in the Centre Directors Guiding Principles. Among them
is a recommendation that genebank material will be made available on condition that the recipient take no steps
restricting their further availability to other interested parties.
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Following a meeting in Rome in January 1992, a joint TAC/Centre Directors´ Working
Group on Intellectual Property developed a combined statement on intellectual property,
biosafety and conservation of plant genetic resources. Specifically on germplasm
distribution, it recommended that, except to NARS (who would continue to receive
genebank material without any forms and restrictions), all material would be distributed
under MTAs. With regard to genebank material, these would spell out that any useful
genes discovered in the material or derived from it could not be withheld from the
country from which the material originated, and that the Centres (plural) could not be
prevented from using the material. A user desiring to commercialize such material or
any derivatives would have to negotiate with the Centre. Breeding material could be
made available to NARS on an exclusive basis in order to grant the NARS an opportunity
to obtain a financial return and to augment scarce financial resources. Users of breeding
material in an industrial country, whether private or public, would be allowed to seek
plant variety protection provided (a) it did not restrain future use of the material by the
Centres, and (b) financial gains were paid into an international fund for the benefit of
developing countries.
At its meeting in Istanbul in May 1992, the CGIAR unanimously adopted a ́ working
document´ which was not a definite policy statement but was to reflect current practices
and to represent broadly held views within the CGIAR system. It mirrors the ́ Suggested
Principles´ issued by the Centre Directors in November 1991; it recognized ´farmers´
rights´; but except for affirming the continued free availability of genebank material, it
did not touch on the question of what users can do with genebank and enhanced
material. The possibility of forestalling intellectual property protection by users of Centre
material was not addressed. The minutes of the meeting state that Centres and their
Boards of Trustees bear the responsibility for developing particular policies and
procedures relating to the major issues dealt with in the working document.
Several Centres have since adopted policies (see Annex 2) which provide for the
use of MTAs in the transfer of germplasm. CIAT and IRRI are actually applying them,
though infrequently, for the release of germplasm to private-sector users. Release
conditions vary widely, from ´research only´ restrictions for all material (ICRISAT), and
prohibition to seek any or some forms of intellectual property (CIMMYT), to free
distribution, with a Centre explicitly retaining the right to distribute the same material to
others (IITA, IRRI).
B. Open or Limited Access - Whose Interests are at Stake?
It is useful to briefly reflect on the competing interests apparent in the debate over
who controls the flow of plant genetic resources.
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1. The Global Community
There is an overriding interest of the world community in fighting poverty and
human want. Germplasm-based agricultural research is a critical and, one could argue,
the most promising avenue to enlarge the Earth´s food resources and production in
order to feed its growing population in a sustainable fashion. In addition to conserving
the diminishing genepool, this calls for maximizing the utilization of genetic resources
in research. A system as open and free as possible to exchange these resources is
the best guaranty that these goals can be met.
2. Developing Countries
As evidenced by the Green Revolution, the free-exchange paradigm has
benefitted developing nations by encouraging public and private sector plant breeding.
At the same time, many developing countries argue that the free-exchange paradigm
has worked to their disadvantage by allowing the North access to their genetic diversity
without adequate and fair compensation. It is the goal of the Convention on Biological
Diversity to level the playing field by giving the South access to the technological and
financial resources of the North. The developing countries, on whose territory the bulk
of the Earth´s still unexploited plant genetic resources is located, now hope to obtain a
fairer deal.
The developing countries are facing a dilemma in achieving this goal: in order to
tender their genetic material they have to display it to potential bidders. Hiding it in the
backyard will arouse the interest of few and be a poor strategy.
At times, the interest of developing countries in releasing their germplasm is obscured
by unrealistic expectations about its ´market potential´. One factor often overlooked in
this discussion is that while there is substantial commercial interest in ´biodiversity
prospecting´ among pharmaceutical companies for plants containing materials of
possible medical relevance, prospects of important commercial gains in the agricultural
sector are less luring. Understandings such as the one concluded between Costa
Rica INBio and Merck & Co.41 appear unlikely to become appropriate models for
agricultural research. There are two reasons. The first is financial: profits from a
pharmaceutical product are likely to be substantially larger than those from a new variety.
The second is inherent in the input structure of the two forms of research. The typical
plant-derived pharmaceutical is a compound extracted directly or indirectly from a
specific plant found or harvested in one nation; and benefits would consequently be
shared with that one nation. In the agricultural case, however, the typical market variety
can be traced to material from many nations, requiring numerous agreements to divide
a probably small profit among a large number of countries.
41 See III.C.5 (page 18 above).
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Both limited ´market potential´ and lack of a ´marketing infrastructure´ leave
developing countries little choice: to realize their newly recognized rights under the
Convention on Biological Diversity, they have to participate in the international exchange
of germplasm. But they will want to do so against assurances that those to whom they
entrust it will support and facilitate their claims to technology access and compensation.
3. Germplasm Users
The germplasm user community has an equally strong interest in the continued
international germplasm exchange and the availability of public genebank services
from which it can draw samples already screened and characterized. Neither the public
nor the private sectors, however, will willingly accept use restrictions, particularly if
they entail conditional payment obligations. Users should, however, be expected to
cooperate in the transfer of knowledge and technology to source countries where they
can do so. They may be less reluctant though, to cooperate in the transfer of knowledge
and technology as long as this does not erode profits and limit their intellectual property
rights.
4. International Centres
The interest of the international Centres is twofold: they want a minimum of
bureaucratic procedure in handling genebank material, and must maintain their access
to genetic material.
In the past, Centres have acquired genetic material through collecting missions
or donations, generally with a minimum of formality. Collecting missions were conducted
on the basis of simple exchanges of letters which documented timing, scope and funding
of a mission, vouched that any movement of germplasm would comply with
phytosanitary regulations and that precautions would be taken to avoid accidental
introduction of pests and diseases. The letters also indicated where duplicate specimens
were to be deposited. Some letter agreements also requested that the host country
authority acknowledge through signature of the letter that the material collected should
be freely available.42  No further conditions were spelt out.
Germplasm donations seem to have been effected with even less formality.
42 ‘’In accordance with the IBPGR principle that all material collected under its funding should be fully and freely
available to all who can use it, your signature below indicates your full agreement with this principle, and that it will be
observed’’. Letter between IBPGR and INSA Vietnam of 28 August 1992.
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Several Centres received donations when they were established; such donations still
account for a large part of currently held accessions.43
To the extent that in future they may have to accept new rules on the exchange of
germplasm they will want to limit legal formalities and standardize procedures as much
as possible. In fact, this should be a shared concern of all actors as they should be
equally interested in containing transaction costs.
But of critical interest to the continued effective conduct of their mission will be the
Centres´ future access to genetic material from developing nations. That access will
depend on whether developing countries consider the transfer of germplasm into Centre
genebanks as being in their own interest, and whether they perceive the Centres as
effectively protecting their interest.
C. Options for the International Centres
How far, then, can the Centres move away from the current free-exchange system
in order to meet the interests of the developing countries, without jeopardizing the flow
and use of genetic material, and limiting their own effectiveness? Is there a way to
reconcile these competing interests?
There are, basically, three options. They vary in the detail, but each has an internal
logic. They differ primarily in the extent to which they impose restrictions on the flow of
germplasm.
The first option would be to maintain as much and as long as possible the free flow
approach. Under this Free-Flow Option Centres would decline imposing any form of
control on the flow of genetic material out of Centre collections. Their argument would
be that they are there to support the developing world through their research effort and
that under the free-flow option they can do this more effectively than in a controlled
system. They could also point to the fact that they annually leverage substantial funds
for their research effort which should be seen as one form of compensation to satisfy
developing country demands under the Convention on Biological Diversity. In addition,
43 Through three workshops in 1977, 1983 and l990 and work plans agreed at these workshops, IRRI conducted
a systematic and comprehensive collection effort which almost doubled the number of accessions at IRRI’s International
Rice Germplasm Centre (IRGC). The initiative was supported by all major rice-growing countries which provided
duplicates of their collections, while gaps were filled through joint collecting efforts. The free exchange of germplasm,
information and experience among participating nations was one of the basic tenets of this endeavour. (see International
Rice Research Institute. Proceedings of the Workshop on the Genetic Conservation of Rice. IRRI 1978; 1983 Rice
Germplasm Conservation Workshop. IRRI 1983; Rice Germplasm - Collecting, Preservation, Use. Proceedings of
Third International Workshop, 10-12 May 1990. IRRI 1991. See also M. Jackson and R. Huggan Sharing the Diversity
of Rice to Feed the World. diversity 9(3):22-25 1993).
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they would continue to support the quest of developing countries for other forms of
compensation44, primarily in the form of improved technology access and increased
support for biodiversity conservation and utilization in developing nations. This
interpretation of compensation requirements would be in line with the 1993 FAO
International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm Collecting and Transfer which
suggests, compensation to primarily take the form of increased international support
for conservation, technology development and technology transfer activities.45 There
would be no need for an MTA under this option.
Under a second option, Centres would go all the way to help developing countries to
realize their rights under the Convention on Biological Diversity. We call it the Institutional
Compensation Option. Centres would seek to maximize financial return from genetic
material for developing nations. To this end, they would be prepared to accept genetic
material from source countries under conditions which would require the Centres to
assume responsibility for negotiating and collecting compensation on the source nations´
behalf. Payments could either be directed to individual source countries, or deposited
into an international fund.
A third option represents a compromise. Under this Compensation Assistance Option
Centres would do all that they can, at defensible cost and without disrupting their
genebank operations, to introduce a measure of control over germplasm releases
designed to preserve and support the claims of source nations to compensation which
the source nations, in turn, would have to pursue with ultimate users. The Centres
would not themselves negotiate agreements, but distribute material under MTAs that
would, to the extent reasonable and possible, protect the source nations´ rights.
Despite the obvious virtues of the Free-Flow Option, we anticipate that the lack of
compensation will no longer, or at least not much longer, be acceptable to the developing
world. By contrast, the administrative cost of the institutional compensation option would
claim a substantial share of Centre budgets, as Centres would have to develop or
procure expensive legal and negotiating capabilities. lt should be discarded on those
grounds.
The foregoing would leave the Compensation Assistance Option which should be
broadly acceptable; it would allow the Centres to operate within a multilateral germplasm
exchange protocol should such a protocol be established under the Convention on
Biological Diversity, or under FAO. Should the international community decide at one
point to develop an international fund to support germplasm conservation, this would
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be compatible with the Compensation Assistance Option. Centres would support and
facilitate the operation of such fund but not act as its collection agents.
D. Compatibility with Trusteeship
In 1988, the CGIAR adopted its policy statement on plant genetic resources46, stating
that its Centres are holding their genebank material ´in trust´, and make it available to
researchers without restrictions. This declaration did not constitute a legal act, but
recognized the arrangements under which Centres had previously received such
material into their custody.47 An important question is whether and to which extent the
Centres´ trusteeship obligations would allow them to support the interests of source
countries under the proposed Compensation Assistance Option.
Trusteeship is a form of holding material for the benefit of a third party, the beneficiary.
Trustees can do almost anything with the subject matter entrusted to them as long as
they do so in accordance with the understanding of those who entrusted the material to
them and act in pursuance of the interest and to the benefit of the beneficiary. Thus,
control and condition on the use of Centre´s genebank material could be imposed
consistently with the trusteeship as long as they are in a pattern that might reasonably
have been contemplated by the provider of the material and serve the interest of the
beneficiary.
In the definition generally used in the CGIAR, the beneficiary of the CGIAR trust is
the global research community, acting in the interest of the developing countries. Adopting
this definition of beneficiary interest, any condition that could potentially slow the flow of
germplasm, the progress of research and the access of the beneficiary to the research
product would be incompatible with the CGIAR trust concept. Similarly, it would be
incompatible with the trust concept for the Centres themselves to seek to profit from
the material in the genebanks.
This leads us to conclude that it is compatible with the current interpretation of the
Centres´ trust obligations if the Centres provide an opportunity for source nations to
benefit from the genetic material they have contributed to Centre´s genebank collections
by ensuring that recipients are aware of possible rights and obligations associated with
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world”.
47 W.E. Siebeck and J.H. Barton. The Implications of Applying the Legal Concepts of Trust to Germplasm Collections
at CGIAR Research Centres. 1992. Diversity 8(3): 29-35 (1992).
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the material, and by providing source nations with the information on which they may
pursue their claims.
This, then, provides the criteria to gauge what conditions Centres can accept, and
subsequently reflect in MTAs under which they distribute the material. The following
section of this paper examines on which terms and conditions Centres can accept
material into their genebank collections in consonance with the above considerations
and, based on the Compensation Assistance Option, proposes a structure of MTAs
reflected in the draft form agreements in Annex 1.
E. Proposed Agreements for the IARCs
In international germplasm exchange the Centres operate at both the receiving and
supplying ends: they receive material from donors in developing and developed
countries, out of existing collections or through collecting missions. And they distribute
it to developing and developed countries, in its original make-up (which we will here
refer to as ´trust material´) or genetically improved (which we will refer to as ´research
products´).
The conditions under which Centres accept material obviously have to reflect the
conditions under which they release it; otherwise, they would not be able to live up to
their commitments to source nations. Detailed provisions for release may, however,
vary according to the use to be made of the material (research or commercial use) and
the character of the partner to whom the material is transferred (NARS or
developed-world entity).
1. Release Conditions
The following paragraphs consider specific release terms.
a. Prior Source Country Consent
A source country might ask a Centre to obtain its prior approval before
releasing material collected on its territory to a subsequent user. If all source countries
put the same condition, this would require obtaining approval for distribution of some
150 000 samples per year. If it could be done at all, the resource requirements to
implement such a system would be enormous, and could not be justified. Alternatively,
if the burden to file for source country consent were placed with the user who then
would have to present the country´s consent agreement to the Centre in order to obtain
the sample, this would ease the administrative burden on the Centre. As a consequence,
breeders in that case are unlikely to use the material; this could, in turn, limit their
contribution to meeting global food needs.
For these reasons, Centres should not accept such release conditions.
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b. Distribution for ´Research only´
A ´research-only´ provision would allow the Centre to distribute material
immediately, i.e. without prior consultation with the provider. A recipient could use the
material for research, but would have to obtain permission to commercialize (and would
therefore have to negotiate). The recipient would also not be permitted to pass the
material or derivatives to third parties without permission, to be sought either directly
from the provider or through the Centre. Such provision fits a collaborative set-up where
a limited amount of (mostly proprietary) material is introduced and researched. However,
in breeding activity involving large numbers of samples of germplasm a ́ research-only´
clause would be difficult to police.
Its effectiveness would depend, in large part, on the good will of recipients. We do
not doubt that most recipients would try to honor the obligation. Often, however, the
obligation may be ignored or simply overlooked, especially when parentage in a new
variety is small. It should also be noted that when seeking permission to commercialize
a breeder would not disclose the make-up of a hybrid´s parental lines.
We therefore would recommend against Centres´ accepting material on this condition.
c. Request not to Distribute Material to Third Parties
Although such a provision is typical in the medical context, we are concerned
that a refusal to allow distribution to third parties would seriously disrupt the exchange
of plant germplasm among scientists. In the medical sector, it is typical for one firm to
study material from one source, while, in the agricultural sector, it is typical for a variety
to include parents from many sources.
If recipients had to seek approval from the Centre or the source country every time
they passed on genetic material, if not ignored such obligation would cause burdensome
paperwork. A practicable arrangement would be to request the recipient that he or she
advise the third party of the interest of the source country in the material and of the
Centre´s contractual request for an evaluation report (see below) every time material
is passed on, and at the same time notify the Centre when such transfer takes place.
We believe this to be the better approach even if this obligation will at times be overlooked
or ignored.
d. Reporting of Pre-Breeding/Evaluation Results
Centres traditionally expect recipients to report evaluation results,
particularly on breeding material they sent out for testing. However, there is at present
no contractual obligation to that effect, and the response seems to be sporadic. At the
same time, there appears to be considerable, and perhaps growing, interest among
source country providers in obtaining and using such information in their own breeding
programmes. Access to pre-breeding information would be an important factor in aiding
technology sharing under the Convention on Biological Diversity.
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We believe that Centres should systematically require recipients to report such
information so that they can make it available to source countries, either periodically or
on request. This should be a commitment they give when accepting trust material into
their collections.
With computerization of genebank data, it should also be possible for Centres to
monitor whether recipients live up to their obligations, and should consider terminating
distribution to recipients who become notorious for ignoring such commitment.
e. Acknowledgement of Origin
Centres should also require users to acknowledge the source country origin
of materials in their scientific publications or in published descriptions of their marketed
varieties. This would promote transparency and a modicum of openness in international
germplasm exchange. It could also help source countries in pursuing their interests in
terms of technology access and compensation.
f. Profit-Sharing Clause
Through a clause in an MTA, a Centre could require the recipient to share
a profit from successful commercial exploitation of a product derived from source material.
Such clause would be legally valid and the Centre could sue the recipient in case of
non-conformance. This appears to be the approach of the National Cancer Institute,
where the Institute expects to work with private firms under licensing arrangements.48
For the international Centres, who distribute material to a large number of recipients,
the difficulty of monitoring and the expense of negotiations suggest that such a
commitment will be impracticable at best. In line with the Compensation Assistance
Option we therefore believe it to be preferable to formulate such a clause as an obligation
of the recipient to be enforced by the source nation. Centres would do what they can to
protect the source nation´s rights by including appropriate language in the MTA, and by
stating their policy goals clearly and publicly.49
48 See section III.C.3 (page 17).
49 Some may argue that a full-fledged legal commitment of the recipient to the Centre would allow the Centre to
sue the recipient in the rare event that windfall profits are derived from genetic material provided by one or
several known source countries. Our response would be that: in such case the source country or countries
should take full responsibility for launching legal proceedings; different jurisdictional systems provide for various
ways for the Centre to support such proceedings.
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g. No-Patent or Grant-Back Clause
Some developing countries oppose any form of intellectual property on
genetic material.50 Even after complying with the TRIPS agreement by legislating some
form of plant breeders´ rights protection, many will still oppose patenting of plant material
including genes. A difficult question is whether a Centre should or could promise to
such nations to prevent such intellectual property protection by subsequent users and
place a condition in an MTA to that effect. Such promise may allay fears of some source
nations that they would not be allowed a share in the commercial value of a patent, or
access to its protected technology. Also, in the interest of a free flow of resources, one
might argue for a prohibition on patenting of genetic material itself. The possibility of
patenting ´naturally occurring genes´ has been precluded in policy pronouncements
issued by some Centres and the CGIAR.51
While a Centre can, and should, enjoin a user not to seek protection that would
restrict the availability of the material itself, it would, however, be unrealistic to expect
the Centre to check attempts by users to patent derivatives. A stipulation to that effect
cannot be policed and would thus not seem very meaningful. One plausible compromise
would be to permit patenting of derivatives, but ensure that such patent rights are not
exercised to the detriment of developing nations, or the international Centres. This would
not prevent a firm from making profits from the genetic material, but would preserve
access to the technology for developing nations and the international agricultural
research community, while triggering the profit-sharing provisions discussed52 above.
Even so, some users in industry (especially those with substantial markets in
developing nations) may be reluctant to accept material on terms that restrict their right
to use a patent in developing countries. For that case, the MTA might allow them to use
intellectual property to protect their invention in developing countries provided they
market it within a reasonable period (say, five years) after the patent was issued and at
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50 In only a few developing nations is there currently a possibility of protecting patent rights, for few grant patents
on genes or plant varieties. This will change as developing nations expand their intellectual property systems to
comply with the Uruguay Round Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement (supra n. 28) states that parties may exclude
from patentability “plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members shall
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or any combination
thereof. The provisions of this sub-paragraph shall be reviewed four years after the entry into force of the Agreement
Establishing the [Multilateral Trade Organization]”. Article 27 (3) (b).
51 See section VI.A.2.d (page 31) above. This formulation presumably allows patents on genes and gene fragments
once they have been removed from the original and implanted into a different host organism.
52 See Section VI.E.1.f. (page 40).
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a reasonable price. This would meet the interests of developing countries in obtaining
access to the new technology. The intellectual property rights would presumably be
enforceable during the first five years after issue. Should the firm not market its invention
within that period, Centres and others would be free to use the invention in these
countries. It should be the responsibility of the interested government, and not of the
Centres, to ensure that a price actually is ´reasonable´.53
h. Tracking and Monitoring Responsibilities
Centres have always logged releases from both their genebank collections
and their breeding programmes. Logs show accession numbers linked to passport
data, as well as the country of origin, and the recipient´s name, institute and country.
While most logs are kept in the form of paper files, going back as many as 40 years,
Centres have in recent years begun to store such data electronically.
Distributions beyond the first recipient, however, could not be tracked. Even if the
first recipient were formally barred from transferring the material and derivatives without
the Centre´s or the provider´s agreement, there would be no practical way for a Centre
to effectively police unauthorized second-round releases. Similarly, a Centre will be in
no position to monitor what recipients are doing with the distributed material, whether
they are still experimenting with it, have commercialized products from it, or whether
they have passed it on in its original or modified forms.
We recommend that Centres accept a tracking responsibility for first-round
distribution, but not beyond. The only monitoring responsibility the Centres can reasonably
discharge - proposed above - would be a periodic check on the return of evaluation
reports with the possibility of terminating further distribution to a neglectful recipient.
i. Storage-Only Provision
Some developing countries are apparently reluctant to deposit material with
Centre genebanks for distribution, and instead may want to offer it for storage only, a
type of ex situ conservation frequently referred to as ´black-box storage´. Under such
an arrangement a genebank provides space only, without assuming responsibility for
maintenance of the material.
53 This should meet the concern that a patent-holder could try to sell the invention in developing country markets
at prices which farmers, and especially small farmers cannot afford. While this would not seem to be a very likely
scenario (why should a firm offer its product at a price only a few can pay?), a country should consider granting a
compulsory licence to a local producer. Under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, such a licence is permitted, albeit
subject to a number of conditions. Note that this situation can develop only in countries that protect such patents.
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Such an arrangement should be considered outside the Centres´ trust responsibility
as currently defined and would deviate far from the concept of a genebank as a service
to the scientific community.54  It would seem appropriate only as a temporary back-up
facility for countries which do not have technically reliable storage facilities, or in an
emergency situation requiring temporary storage for their collections. However, in no
case should Centres assume trustee responsibilities for such material, or offer
assistance in characterizing and evaluating it.
j. Time and Application Limits
In parallel to statutory time limits on the protection of intellectual property
such as patents and copyrights, we believe that material obtained by Centres under
release conditions, should, after a certain period, become generally available, that is,
without an MTA.
The draft form agreements therefore include language that all intellectual-property
oriented obligations lapse after 30 years. This time limit is obviously subject to negotiation.
Thirty years reflect the fact that patent systems are moving globally toward a 20-year
term. At the same time, there have been cases in which materials are found to be
useful after spending 20 years or more in a genebank. Hence we chose a somewhat
longer time.
We also included a limitation that a source plant should be accounted for if it makes
up one-fourth or more of a plant that is actually marketed and that it should not be
accounted for if it makes up less of the marketed plant. Again, the choice of one-fourth
is arbitrary and may be reviewed from time to time, but is comparable to practice within
the commercial breeding community. Clearly, such a limitation should not apply in the
event that a breeding parent is used for one specific gene, whether introduced into the
marketed plant by backcrossing or by genetic engineering.
k. Recommended Release Conditions
To summarize: when accepting genetic material subject to the Convention
on Biological Diversity into their collections, Centres should agree to release it under
the following conditions:
That the Centre would require a recipient to acknowledge the source nation´s
contribution in any publications or variety descriptions
54 Such an arrangement has been suggested to one Centre as an alternative to in-trust storage. In an unrelated
case, two African Centres have been requested by a Southern African regional group of countries not to distribute
recently collected material outside that group until it has been assessed for possible commercially valuable traits.
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• to notify the Centre of any transfer of the material or its derivatives to a third
party, and to require a similar restriction when transferring the material to that
third party
• to issue to the Centre a report on pre-breeding/evaluation results
• in the event of successful commercialization of research products deriving from
the material, to provide a reasonable share of net profits to the source nation in a
form to be agreed upon between the recipient and that nation. This could be through
payments, training assistance, technology transfer, or other forms of collaboration.
• to observe the following restrictions concerning intellectual property55:
(a) not to seek rights on the material itself, and
(b) not to assert rights on derivatives (through  the third  generation)  against
nationals of the source country, other developing countries, the issuing
Centre or other CGIAR Centres, unless it has actually marketed a product
containing the technology in the relevant developing country within five
years after issuance of such rights, these obligations should lapse after a
period of, say, 30   years; and that the Centre itself would:
• notify a recipient of the name and agency of the source nation that has provided
the material, and of the possible interest that country may have in  the  material
under the Convention on Biological Diversity
• track the destination of distributed germplasm to  the  first  recipient  (first-round
releases). Either periodically or upon request, it would advise the source nations
of releases effected during a specified period. At the choice of the source nation
this information would be available in hardcopy or machine-readable form
• monitor the filing of pre-breeding/evaluation data  by recipients  and make  them
available from its database to source nations.
Similarly to the recipient´s obligations, a Centre´s obligation to notify, track and
monitor should also lapse after a period of, say, 30 years. A Centre may still want to
maintain the procedures beyond such date, but should have the discretion to terminate
them.
2. Three Model Agreements
Based on the frequency at which they are likely to occur and on the need for
special terms, three typical transfer situations can be chosen and distinguished.
55 The International Centres are currently negotiating an agreement with FAO which would place plant genetic material
they hold in trust under FAO´s auspices as part of FAO´s network of ex situ collections to be established under the
International Undertaking. Under the proposed agreement the Centres would not seek intellectual property rights on
the genetic material itself, and would ensure that recipients are bound by the same commitment. This commitment
would not extend to derivatives. Our above proposal would be consistent with these provisions.
44   ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES No. 1
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
Each calls for different rules and conditions. For these three situations we have proposed
form agreements. There will be other situations which Centres may also want to cover
through agreements for which we believe agreements can be developed by modifying
the proposed form agreements. The three form agreements would cover:
• the acquisition of germplasm
• the distribution of genetic material
• the distribution of research products to NARS.
a. MTA for Acquisition of Germplasm
Form agreement ́ A´ for acquiring germplasm would reference the conditions
which a Centre would apply in distributing the acquired germplasm. Although this can
be done by attaching the actual forms to be used in distributing the material, it is probably
more transparent to reference the Centre´s policy statement which describes the overall
Centre policy. This would facilitate future changes in release policies.
In addition, the MTA would set out the Centres own rights and obligations, and
limitations thereof, namely
• the Centre´s obligations as a trustee to safeguard and maintain the material to
the highest technical standards
• its right to use the material in its own research and breeding programmes
• its intention not to exercise intellectual property rights over the material itself, and
not to exercise any such rights on derivatives against developing country nations
• provisions concerning the conduct of the acquisition (collecting mission or
donation) of the genetic material.
There should be no time limit on these obligations, including the trusteeship
obligations.
b. MTA for Distribution of Genetic Material
Save for the release of research products to NARS for which we will propose
a special agreement, all distribution of germplasm, whether trust or enhanced material,
should be covered in one and the same agreement. There is also no need to differentiate
between types of recipient, whether in the private or public sector, profit or not-for-profit
organization, and in developing or developed countries. In this regard, current CGIAR
policy of releasing material to any bona fide researcher would be maintained. Under
form agreement ́ B´, a Centre would identify the interests of source nations. The language
is designed to allow for the fact that the distributed material may contain components
collected from different source nations at different times, before or after the entry into
force of the Convention.56
56 lt is not designed to protect rights of suppliers of proprietary material incorporated in Centre material; modifications
would be necessary in such case. See discussion in section IVE3 (page 44).
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c. MTA for Distribution of Research Products to NARS
For distribution of research products to NARS we propose Form Agreement
´C´. NARS are the continual collaborators of the International Centres. They provide
the link between the Centres´ mission and that mission´s primary beneficiary, the
developing-country farmer. The functions of the international Centres and NARS are
complementary, or are becoming increasingly so, as NARS gain in research capacity
and capability. Eventually, the international Centres will discharge strategic research
tasks, while NARS will adapt the resulting research products in their national breeding
and enhancement programmes.
This close collaboration suggests, that: germplasm exchange can be largely based
on mutual trust, justifying a modified MTA. There are also other considerations that may
justify a simpler type of transfer agreement in relation to NARS. First, since the thrust
of the Convention on Biological Diversity was to level the playing field between the
North and the South, it is likely that source countries in the South will be less concerned
with the strict application of the Convention´s tenets if genetic material is exchanged
within the South.57
 
The second argument for a simpler MTA with NARS is that many
NARS are likely to find it difficult to fulfill complex notification and pass-through
commitments. Third, as NARS mostly distribute material directly to farmers, such
commitments should not be required.
Consequently, we propose that distributions to the NARS include a reduced notification
requirement that only applies when a NARS distributes material for further breeding
work. We further believe that it will not be necessary to include restrictions on intellectual
property. As noted above, in many developing countries such rights could not be enforced
at this point. Moreover, in countries where NARS could file for protection, licensing of
protected material to private sector breeders and distributors could improve prospects
for marketing such material. 58
57 Given the reluctance or refusal by some developing countries to release industrial crop germplasm to other
developing countries, this assumption may be questionable.
58 This proposal was included in the recommendations of the TAC/Centre Directors´ Working Group on Intellectual
Property adopted at its meeting in Rome in January 1992 (see section IVA2d, page 28).
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3. Distribution of Germplasm under Research Collaboration with the Private
Sector
Several Centres have been contracting with private research institutions for
the supply of advanced biotechnology processes and proprietary genetic material.
Typically, in such research collaboration, the Centre will use basic genetic material
either from its genebank or its breeding program, while the partner will provide a
proprietary technology. Research work may be carried out at the Centre´s or the
collaborators research facilities or both. The need to enter into technology supply
arrangements is likely to grow if the developing world is to receive the benefit of genes
and gene technology patented in the developed world.
When acquiring proprietary material under collaboration agreements with advanced
laboratories, the Centres may have to accept distribution limitations and restrictions
they would not accept for material to be received into their genebanks. This will pose a
new and different set of problems. In such case, the Centres will have to respect
restrictions imposed by the supplier of such material, but they should be careful in
determining what restrictions they can accept.
Because each collaboration will be different, we do not suggest developing a form
agreement for such research collaboration. We expect, in fact, that in most cases
Centres will have to negotiate on the basis of form agreements proposed by the
technology supplier. Some thoughts follow on what terms and conditions Centres may,
or should not, accept in such collaboration agreements.
Among the reasonable restrictions would be a requirement not to pass proprietary
research materials to third parties whale the collaborative research is in progress, and
to return such material to the provider if the research does not lead to a product.
If the research is expected to result in product development, Centres should also be
willing to respect the interests of the supplier in developed-country markets, while
insisting that the Centre will be allowed to distribute the product in developing countries.
This means that a Centre would commit itself not to release products including, or
developed from, proprietary materials to developed-nation firms, and in particular not
to pass any material containing a proprietary gene to firms, that would adapt them for
developed world markets.
Concerning the distribution of such material to NARS for use in developing countries,
Centres should negotiate for a royalty-free licence, or at most accept agreements
authorizing payment of a nominal royalty on products used in developing nations. They
should ensure that they can make such material available to NARS under a sublicensing
agreement which, in turn, would set out the terms under which NARS would be
authorized to make material available in their markets. In no case should the Centres
agree to collect royalties from a NARS on behalf of their collaborator; nor should they
collect royalties from a NARS with respect to their own contributions to a research
product.
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F. Implications for the Centres
1. The Need for a Uniform Approach
It would seem essential for the Centres to take a uniform approach in their
decisions as to what restrictions to accept on material obtained in the post-Convention
era. Should any one Centre accept germplasm on terms more favourable to the source
than do others, similar terms will be demanded of all Centres and by all suppliers. It
would seem imperative that these terms be explained to, and reviewed with, a
representative number of source nations and user organizations before they are actually
used. Any differences should only be those associated with genuinely different situations.
Thus, the analysis here focused primarily on agricultural plants. A Centre such as
ICLARM or the future African Livestock Centre, working with animal germplasm, or
Centres such as ICRAF and CIFOR, working with material that may have agricultural
as well as medical applications, may have legitimately different needs — but it is only
differences at this level that should lead to special approaches.
2.  Signature of Form Agreements
In general, the legal arrangements for the Centres should be kept as simple
as possible. In the case of collecting expeditions, it will be appropriate to use a full
rather than a letter agreement, to be signed by both sides. As these expeditions are
relatively infrequent, establishing a formal agreement should not pose an undue burden.
In the case of distributions of germplasm under Form Agreements ´B´ and ´C´,
however, administrative costs would become overwhelming if separate agreements
were to be sought and signed by both sides before distribution. Hence, even though
the approach may not always be enforceable, we recommend using a policy statement
to the genetic resources community, coupled with a form letter restating the conditions
governing the distribution of germplasm.
3. Description of Material in MTAs
All Centres currently include with their releases the passport data of the material
which show the country from which it was collected or otherwise obtained. In the cover
letter for a transfer, any other genetic or fingerprint information should also be included
to the extent available, if only as a benefit to the recipient. Although it is not essential to
reference this information, it could assist should there be a later dispute as to whether
the transferred material was actually used in a marketed product.
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The Centres, however, should not place themselves in a position of guaranteeing
the source of the material; otherwise, they would be opening themselves to unnecessary
liabilities. This is particularly the case where the actual origin of the material is unknown
or subject to dispute — i.e. the material was collected in a disputed territory, or the
collected organism had only recently been introduced into the nation from which it was
collected.
4. Material to be Covered by MTAs
All material subject to the Convention on Biological Diversity, i.e. germplasm
collected after 29 December 1993, together with material reasonably describable as
derived from such germplasm, should be covered under the proposed procedure. It
does not matter whether this material is in a base or a working collection, or even
whether it is in a genebank at all. As long as the material falls under the regime of the
Convention, there is a clear obligation to the source nation.
The Centres may, however, want to consider whether MTAs should be applied to all
material distributed by a Centre, including material that does not fall under the Convention
on Biological Diversity. As the form agreement would note the time of collection of the
source material, it would be clear whether there is a legal obligation to source nations.
Even when there is no obligation because the material was acquired prior to 29
December 1993, a Centre may elect to provide information on the source country to
the user, and on the user to the source nation. In favour of such an approach is the
possibility of providing an additional benefit to source nations, if only in the form of the
information gained from the recipient of the material. Moreover, there may be an
advantage in instituting one uniform procedure for all distribution rather than using
different procedures according to the date of accession. However, for some of this
material, particularly from early donations, the actual source or time of collection may
be unknown. While we believe that either approach is reasonable, we drafted our sample
forms on the assumption that they would be used with all transfers.
Special arrangements will be necessary for material derived under special technology
collaboration agreements; these arrangements will depend on the terms of the specific
collaboration.
5. Warranties and Liability Limitations
In order to protect the Centres, we believe that a form agreement should include
liability limitations to ensure that the Centres are not committing themselves to the
safety of the material (even stronger disclaimers and procedures would be required
should the Centres distribute transgenic material). Moreover, Centres should guard
against any liability for possible misidentification of the source nation of the material.
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6. Policing Requirements
As noted above, it would be impractical, if not impossible, for the Centres to
undertake monitoring responsibilities beyond tracking first-round distributions and filing
of pre-breeding reports. Neither should they undertake the litigation in case of violations
of distribution agreements. This would be the responsibility of the source nation involved.
7. Aspects not Covered in Proposed Form Agreements
There are three important aspects we have not considered. One is the choice
of law clause, the second the need for an arbitration clause. Needs for such clauses
will vary from Centre to Centre. At the same time, it would be preferable if all agreements
could reference the law of one specific nation, and thus be interpreted uniformly.
A third and important issue is the definition of ́ developing nations,´ when used in the
form agreements. The question arises, for instance, whether the successor states of
the Former Soviet Union and Eastern European nations should be treated as developed
or developing countries.
8. Applicability of Form Agreements to Others
Although our form agreements are designed for use by the international
Centres, with some adaptations a nation could use these in negotiating agreements for
exchange of genetic material with other countries.
9. Suggestions for Further Steps
Assuming that the suggestions in this paper are considered generally
appropriate, it is essential to review the suggested draft agreements within the CGIAR
system, with source nations, users and the NGO community.
G. Assessment
The proposed set of form agreements and the rules and clauses contained therein
are unlikely to satisfy the multiple interests we have earlier identified. They may not go
far enough for some developing countries, who want to present a stronger claim for
compensation. The user community, particularly in industry, should be expected to
argue that the proposed rules are too burdensome and that they will not use material
with the proposed strings attached.
It should, however, be realized by both sides, that, as presented, this imperfect
compromise offers benefits to both. It offers the breeding industry continued access to
the international collection effort; while for the source countries it does level the playing
field by providing them access to information on users and breeding results they
previously did not have, as well as a possibility of compensation.
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Beyond this, we realize that the future global collaboration in the exchange and
development of germplasm, on which both the South and the North depend, will only
work in a spirit of mutual understanding and fair play. Material transfer agreements can
lay the basis for such collaboration but cannot replace the spirit.
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ANNEX 1: Suggested Form Agreements and Policy Statement
FORM AGREEMENT ´A´ FOR ACQUISITION OF GERMPLASM:
1. [Nation ] grants germplasm to [Centre ] under the following terms and conditions.
2. [Nation]  warrants that the germplasm comes from within its territory and that it is
legally free to provide the germplasm to [Centre ].
3. [Centre] will hold the material in trust, place it in its genebank, maintain it, periodically
regenerate it, duplicate it for security reasons and provide state-of-the-art long-term
conservation.
4. [Centre]  will make the material available to any user under an agreement as
described in the attached policy statement, with terms intended (a) to indicate to recipient
that [Nation ] may have an interest in the material, (b) to require the recipient to notify
[Centre ] as to any further destination of the material, and (c) to restrict the recipient
from obtaining intellectual property rights on the material itself and asserting such rights
on derivatives against a developing-nation user.
5. [Centre]  is free to improve and breed with the material in any fashion. Should
[Centre ] develop advanced varieties or separate genes from the material, it will not
exercise any patent rights it may obtain against [Nation ] or any developing nation.
6. The [Centre´s]  obligations at (a) to (c) of paragraph 4 of this agreement shall
expire at the end of 30 years.
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FORM AGREEMENT ´B´ FOR DISTRIBUTION OF GENETIC MATERIAL
1. This material is or derives (in part or in total) from material collected in or provided
to the [Centre ] by [Nations ] and was collected [before/after] the entry into force of the
United Nations Convention on Biological diversity and thus [is not/is] subject to the
rights that [Nation ] has under the Convention. In case of successful commercialization
of any gene deriving directly from material provided by [Nation ] and subject to the
Convention or of any plant tracing one-fourth or more of its lineage to such material,
[Recipient ] is subject to an obligation to provide a reasonable compensation to the
source nation in a form to be agreed upon between the recipient and that nation. This
could be through payments, training assistance, technology transfer, or other forms of
collaboration.
2. [Centre ] is notifying [Nations ] as to this transfer.
3. [Recipient ] will provide [Centre ] with the results of any evaluation trials it may
perform. Upon request, these will be passed on by [Centre ] to [Nations ].
4. [Recipient ] shall not obtain any form of intellectual property protection on this
material.
5. Should [Recipient ] pursue intellectual property protection on any gene or other
invention deriving from the material or any plant tracing one-fourth or more of its lineage
to the material, it may not assert the resulting rights against anyone in a developing
nation after five years from the date of grant of the intellectual property right, unless,
during that time, it has made the invention available within the nation at a reasonable
price. [Recipient ] will ensure that any third party who takes the material or material
owing one-fourth or more of its lineage to the material, or receives a licence under a
patent that [Recipient ] may obtain from the material, will be subject to a similar obligation.
For the purposes of this paragraph, ´developing nations´ include ....
6. Should [Recipient ] provide the material, genes derived directly from it, or material
tracing one-fourth or more of its lineage to the material to any entity other than for
distribution to farmers, it shall notify [Centre ] of the transfer.
7. [Centre ] makes no warranties as to the safety or title of the material, nor as to the
accuracy or correctness of any passport or other data provided with the material.
8. [Recipient ]´s obligations with respect to acquiring intellectual property rights and
with respect to any obligations it may have to [Nations ] shall expire at the end of 30
years.
9. Material is supplied expressly conditional on [Recipient ]´s acceptance of the terms
of this letter. [Recipient ]´s retention of the material constitutes such acceptance.
54   ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES No. 1
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
FORM AGREEMENT ´C´ FOR DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRE RESEARCH
PRODUCTS TO NARS:
1. This material derives (in part or in total) from material collected in or provided to
the [Centre ] by [Nations ].
2. [Centre ] is notifying [Nations ] as to this transfer.
3. [NARS] will (a) make the material and material derived from it available at nominal
cost to its farmers, or (b) make it available on an exclusive basis to a firm that will
distribute it to its farmers according to national law, provided that such distribution shall
be on terms favourable to the farmers.
4. Should NARS provide the material or close derivatives to any entity other than for
distribution to its farmers, it shall notify the recipient that the material includes material
provided by [Nations ], that it may be subject to compensation obligations, and shall
notify [Centre] of the transfer.
5. [NARS] will provide [Centre ] with the results of any evaluation trials it may perform.
These may be passed on by [Centre ] to [Nation ].
6. [Centre ] makes no warranties as to the safety or title of the material, nor as to the
accuracy or correctness of any passport or other information supplied with the material.
7. [NARS]´s obligations with respect to any compensation obligations it may have to
[Nations ] shall expire at the end of 30 years.
8. Material is supplied expressly conditional on [NARS]´s acceptance of the terms
of this letter. [NARS]´s retention of the material constitutes such acceptance.
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POLICY STATEMENT ON MATERIAL TRANSFER AGREEMENTS
[Centre ] holds large quantities of germplasm in trust; it distributes this germplasm to
third parties for agricultural research and it works with the germplasm in its own research.
This research and its products are the primary benefit that [Centre ] provides to the
developing world.
Following the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity on 29 December 1993, [Centre ] will recognize the specific rights of source
nations supplying germplasm to [Centre ] in its germplasm release policy. This policy
duly reflects the concerns of source nations and of their farmers who have been
improving the material over historical time. [Centre] is also cognizant of the costs of
elaborate legal documentation and of the need to focus its own resources on research.
lt therefore adopts, the following policy:
(1) In any transfer of germplasm, whether material in its genebank or material
improved by its own research, but without making warranty as to the genetic
make-up of the transferred material, [Centre ] will notify the recipient of the
identity of nations that may have an interest in the material.
(2) [Centre ] will require the recipient to (a) acknowledge the source of the material
in any publications reporting on its use or descriptions of marketed varieties
derived thereof; and (b) notify it of any transfer of the material or its derivatives
to a third party, to request that third party to also notify such transfer, and to
issue to [Centre ] a report on evaluation results.
(3) [Centre ] will track the destination of release germplasm to the first recipient
(first-round releases). Either periodically or upon request, it will advise the source
nation of releases effected during a specified period. At the choice of the source
nation, this information would be available in hardcopy or machine-readable
form. On the same terms, [Centre ] will provide prebreeding/evaluation data
from its, database.
(4) [Centre ] will not claim intellectual property rights over the material held in
trust.
(5) [Centre ] will also require that the recipient is not to obtain intellectual property
rights on the material as supplied, and that any plant breeders rights in derivative
lines or patents on genes or similar inventions deriving from the material are to
be asserted in a developing  nation only if the relevant material or material
containing the relevant invention is made available in the particular developing
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nation at a reasonable price within five years from the time of grant of the
property right.
(6) [Centre ] will advise the recipient that the material may be subject to the
Convention on Biological Diversity and that, in case of successful
commercialization of research products deriving from the material, the recipient
is subject to an obligation to provide a reasonable share of net profits to the
source nation in a form to be agreed upon between the recipient and that
nation. This could be through payments, training assistance, technology
transfer, or other forms of collaboration.
(7) The 5th and 6th obligations will reach genes derived from the material and
plants incorporating one-fourth or more of the source material. They will expire
after 30 years.
(8) This policy will be attached to a cover letter agreement to be dispatched with
the material.
The [Centre ] recognizes that its policy at paragraph (6) may not necessarily create
a formal legal obligation under all nation´s legal systems on the part of the recipient to
compensate source nations from any profits. The [Centre], however, will seek to state
the commitment in a way likely to be honoured by both legal systems and recipients,
and believes that the use of the [Centre´s] resources to undertake the legal and
accounting work to enforce a legal obligation would be far less beneficial to developing
nations than use of its resources for research.
The [Centre ] will not accept genebank material on any terms other than these.
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ANNEX 2: CGIAR Centres Current Germplasm Distribution Policies
Five Centres have to date issued policies (some described as interim policies)
specifically dealing with the distribution of germplasm, either from their genebanks, or
their breeding and research programmes.
CIAT
CIAT´s ´Interim Policy on Intellectual Property´ of April 1993 allows for restrictions on
germplasm release in three cases: (1) to prevent appropriation of CIAT research
products; (2) to protect intellectual property of research collaborators; and (3) to enable
commercialization of CIAT research products through others. Genebank material will
be distributed under MTAs on condition that recipient will “not appropriate these public
goods”. New varieties developed from material can be protected under IPR. (And so
can apparently all other derivatives.) The statement further proposes that MTAs will be
drafted, and that rules will be set to prevent appropriation of individual genes. The
statement also proposes three remedies if a recipient violates the provisions of an
MTA: such violation would (1) void the MTA; (2) make the recipient ineligible for future
distribution: and (3) entail legal action by CIAT.
CIAT has since developed an MTA for the distribution of materials used for soil
cover in coffee and cacao plantations. It requires the recipient (1) not to seek protection
of the material or essentially derived varieties; and (2) not to transfer it to third parties
without CIATs authorization. Its duration would be indefinite.59
CIMMYT
The ´CIMMYT Policy on Intellectual Property´ was approved by its Board of Trustees
31 March 1993. lt stipulates that “plant genetic resources held in trust will be made
available to recipients who agree to take no steps that restrict the further availability of
those resources in their original form to other interested parties”.
A draft policy on ́ Distribution and Release of CIMMYT Maize Germplasm Products´
is available in an October 1993 version. According to it, genebank material will be
available on condition that use (presumably in its original form) will not be restricted to
others. Inbred lines and source populations will be supplied on request without release
conditions; if supplies of such material are limited, it will be supplied, in order of priority,
first to NARS, then to developing-country private sector, and last to developed-country
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private-sector recipients; material developed through collaborative trials will be available
to collaborators; material developed by CIMMYT will be available to scientific
collaborators; material obtained from others will be distributed only with the consent of
the originator.
On 3 August 1993, CIMMYT issued a ´Policy on Use of Bread Wheat, Durum
Wheat, Triticale and Barley Germplasm Distributed by CIMMYT - Reaffirmation of a
Long Standing Policy´. According to it, genebank material is freely available (note that
CIMMYT also holds ́ obsolete varieties´ in its genebank, i.e. material no longer in active
breeding programmes, which is also freely available). Breeding material is distributed




) are distributed without conditions. Advanced
lines (F
6
 and higher) are distributed on condition that no Plant Breeders´ Right will be
obtained without CIMMYT´s permission. No non-CIMMYT material obtained from
CIMMYT can be transferred without permission by the originator.
ICRISAT
According to ICRISAT´s Interim Guidelines, genebank material will be distributed without
restriction to governmental recipients in developing countries, but to all others for
research purposes only. Governmental recipients will be requested to add the same
restriction when transferring material to third parties. Breeding material and other
ICRISAT research products will be distributed to users in developing countries in
accordance with existing agreements with these countries. All others would receive
the material for research only. Commercialization would require a licence to safeguard
the interests of developing countries. For-profit users would be required to pay a
reasonable royalty.
IITA
A ´Statement on Intellectual Property Management at IITA´ was issued in April 1993
after endorsement by lITA´s Board of Trustees. According to it, genebank material will
be distributed without restriction, while breeding material is distributed on condition that
it not be used exclusively by a single organization. (This limitation may be intended to
preclude a recipient from obtaining intellectual property rights on the material itself;
however, as long as it was shared with at least one other organization, e.g. through a
licence, the clause would appear to allow the recipient to obtain protection, also on the
material itself.)
Some IITA research products (microorganisms and arthropods) will be made
available for research purposes only.
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IRRI
According to ´The Policy of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) on Rice
Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property Rights´ of April 1993, trust material is
available without restriction. “IRRI is opposed to the application of patent legislation to
plant genetic resources (genotypes and/or genes) held in trust”.
A second policy statement, ́ The Policy of the International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI) on Hybrid Rice and Intellectual Property Rights´ also issued in April 1993 also
states that all breeding material is freely available. IRRI retains the right to distribute to
others. It requests recognition of the use of its material when a variety is released by a
recipient.
IRRI uses an MTA for distribution of enhanced material to private seed
companies. It requires acknowledgement of the source country and cost-free sharing
of varieties derived by the recipient.
